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THE PUZZLE OF FAMILY LAW PLURALISM 
EREZ ALONI* 
Family law is succumbing to pluralism. Scholars have celebrated 
this trend as a desirable outcome of the struggle for marriage equality. And a 
pluralistic family law seems to offer distinct benefits: more regimes than just 
marriage, and greater room for choice within each regime (manifest by more 
types of legally enforceable intrafamilial contracts). This Article exposes 
counterintuitive facts that lead to a surprising conclusion: the legal changes 
that scholars tout as increasing pluralism eviscerate the substance of the 
choices families are permitted to make. 
The policies that appear to extend choice within each regime, in 
fact, mask what I call a “neoclassical” approach to intrafamilial contracts—
that is, an approach that adopts formalist, binary, and proceduralist principles 
for the creation of legal obligations. As this Article’s scrutiny of prenuptial and 
cohabitation agreements reveals, neoclassical contract theory is slowly 
taking over family law. The neoclassical approach vindicates a thin notion of 
autonomy over other values and favors the status quo. The Article further 
contends that the roots of family law pluralism in market logic render it 
fundamentally flawed: as long as the menu of relationship options is 
predicated on basic contract law, then, regardless of how many options the 
menu includes, the system will necessarily privilege the more economically 
powerful partner. 
Is it possible to avoid this perverse result while preserving freedom 
of choice? The Article develops a more robust vision of pluralism by 
identifying the goals and methods of pluralism in family law as they have 
developed over time. In doing so, the Article offers foundations of a new 
theory of pluralism that advances true substantive equality and autonomy.  
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Huntington, Patricia Leary, Kaiponanea T. Matsumura, Dara E. Purvis, Carol Sanger, 
Elizabeth S. Scott, Elizabeth Sepper, Marc Spindelman, and Allison Tait. I also benefited 
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2015 Family Law Scholars and Teachers Conference, the Workshop on Shifting 
Foundations in Family Law: Family Law’s Response to Changing Families, and Harvard 
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INTRODUCTION 
In the wake of the struggle for marriage equality, legal scholars have 
observed (and generally celebrated) that family law is moving toward 
developing a menu of options for legal recognition of relationships.
1
  That is, 
as an unintended consequence of the process leading to securing marriage 
rights for same-sex couples, a new and more pluralistic regulatory regime 
has emerged. This menu of options is two-dimensional. One, it consists of 
more regulatory regimes than just marriage, including several registration 
schemes for recognition of relationships (such as marriage, civil unions, and 
domestic partnerships) and the option to establish financial obligations 
between unmarried partners without registration. Two, there is greater room 
for variety and choice within each regime. This flexibility is established by 
multiple contractual instruments available for couples to organize the 
financial obligations between them (such as prenuptial, postnuptial, 
cohabitation, and separation agreements).
2
Some scholarship has touted the movement of family law from an era of 
privatization to an era of pluralism. As a descriptive matter, some scholars 
argue that family law has already started incorporating the basic form of 
1
See, e.g., WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE JR., EQUALITY PRACTICE: CIVIL UNIONS AND THE 
FUTURE OF GAY RIGHTS 121 (2002); Erez Aloni, Registering Relationships, 87 TUL. L. 
REV. 573, 626 (2013); William N. Eskridge Jr., Family Law Pluralism: The Guided- 
Choice Regime of Menus, Default Rules, and Override Rules, 100 GEO. L.J. 1881, 1891 
(2012). 
2
See Eskridge, supra note 1, at 1884 (“The simultaneous contraction and expansion of 
family law have usually not been treated in public discourse as related phenomena . . . .”). 
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 Structural pluralism refers to the structure and 
organization of the law.
4 
 In the case of family law, it refers to the formation of 
multiple options for legal recognition of relationships and to the wider scope 
for innovation and choice within each regulatory regime. On the normative 
side, scholars rely on different principles (utilitarianism, autonomy, and value 
pluralism), but the claim is quite similar under each: to accommodate 
people’s autonomy, or to maximize their overall well-being, the state must 
facilitate a variety of regulatory options—tailored for diverse types of family 
structures—that will enable partners to arrange the legal consequences of 
their relationships.
5
 Extending contractual choice and enabling more flexibility 
within each regulatory regime are also consistent with the role of the state as 
facilitating couples’ (or individuals’) autonomy because expanding the variety 
of substantive contractual arrangements that courts are willing to enforce will 




However, is the development of multiple options for arrangements of 
relationships truly a cause for celebration? Registration schemes have either 
disappeared or played an insignificant role in the menu of options. This is 
because several states, after they legalized same-sex marriage, decided to 
abolish their registration schemes.
7
 For example, Connecticut, New 
Hampshire, and Vermont eliminated such registrations after they legalized 





See id. at 1889 (“To be specific, American family law in the last century . . . has 
moved toward a pluralist regime where each state offers a larger menu of options for 
romantic couples, including those with children.”).[emphasis on original] 
4
Structural pluralism is also a normative theory because the theory addresses (or 
should address) three matters: (1) the object of pluralism—what institutions should be on 
this menu, (2) the type of pluralism—what values should be encompassed in and 
distributed by the menu, and (3) the justification for pluralism—why pluralism. Rutger J.G. 
Claassen, Institutional Pluralism and the Limits of the Market, 8 POL. PHIL. & ECON. 420, 421 
(2009).  
5 
For a utilitarian-based argument for structural pluralism, see Eskridge, supra note 1, 
at 1887 (“The utilitarian approach accommodates our social pluralism in family formation, 
such that the state recognizes a variety of family institutions, each tailored to different 
circumstances and preferences.”). See JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 372 (1986), for an 
argument that autonomy requires an adequate range of choices. See Shahar Lifshitz, 
Married Against Their Will? Toward a Pluralist Regulation of Spousal Relationships, 66 
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1565, 1589–1601 (2009), for autonomy-based arguments on family law 
pluralism relying on Raz’s work. 
6 
See, e.g., Jeffrey Evans Stake, Paternalism in the Law of Marriage, 74 IND. L.J. 801, 
818 (1999) (“The menu of options should include all of the serious proposals. Since almost 
anything that can be written into law can be written into an agreement, one way to offer all 
of the good proposals is to allow private contracting.”); see also infra note 45 R and 
accompanying text.  
7 
In the United States, typically, the legal institutions that were created initially as a 
compromise in the legal struggle for marriage equality—civil unions, domestic partnerships, 
and the like—were abolished after the legalization of same-sex marriage. See Aloni, supra 
note 1, at 626. Some states (for example, Hawaii and Illinois) maintained their registration 
schemes—but not only is this the exception, it remains to be seen whether couples are 
actually going to use them. See Kaiponanea T. Matsumura, A Right Not to Marry, 84 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1509, 1519 (2016). 
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to elderly couples only.
8
  And, in any event, such registrations are often 
designed in a way that is not attractive to many couples—because the 
registrations take the form of marriage with a different name—and hence are 
hardly used by partners. Additionally, a few scholars have already criticized 
the assumption that the multiple registration schemes advanced autonomy.
9
  
Therefore, the reality is that what looks like structural pluralism is 
predominantly manifested by the movement toward flexibility and choice 
within each regulatory regime. Namely, the menu of options is developing 
primarily in its second dimension by the increasing acceptance of a narrow 
subset of possible agreements between intimate partners (options to 
contract about financial obligations between married and unmarried 
partners).
10
 In other words, so-called structural pluralism is reduced to the 
intensification of ex-ante private rulemaking options.  
If, then, private ordering and individual autonomy are the new 
articulations of pluralistic structure, the question becomes what is pluralism 
anyway— and how is it different from privatization? Scholarship cheering the 
development of pluralistic family law has given the term “pluralism” different 
meanings. Further, literature in the field of family law has failed to adequately 
define the object of pluralism and the type of goods that should be bolstered 
by structural pluralism.
11
 Therefore, I explore the various definitions of 
pluralism and the way it has emerged, in some quarters, as a synonym for 
individual autonomy.  
For this reason, the important and unanswered question that emerges is 
whether the law of intrafamilial contracts promotes or detracts from family 
law pluralism. Although the debate about the pros and cons of private 
ordering in family law is an old and much discussed one, private ordering is 
now dressed up in a new costume: pluralism. I assert that the relationship 
between private ordering and pluralism has received scant attention by 
family law scholars and is inadequately theorized.  
To better understand the relationships between structural pluralism and 
private ordering I examine what types of values are promoted by private 
rulemaking in the family. I use functional analysis, focusing on two types of 





8 Same Sex Marriage, 2012 Wash. Sess. Laws 199.  
9 
See infra note 44 and accompanying text (surveying the main criticism on the 
additional registration schemes as enhancing pluralism).   
10 By “narrow subset,” I mean to indicate that despite the intensification of private 
ordering in the family law system, courts still enforce only a particular set of promises (such 
as those that define the financial obligations between the partners upon divorce) to the 
exclusion of other possible agreements (such as agreements about the duties of the 
spouses during the relationship). See infra Part III.  
11See infra Part I.  
12 While I use the term “cohabitation agreement,” I acknowledge that, for the most part, 
cohabiting couples do not execute such agreements and that courts use a variety of legal 
theories to find financial obligations between unmarried partners. Yet, as I explain in Part 
II.C, this is precisely the reduction and entrenchment of contractual elements in   
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This examination analyzes the way that the contractual options function and 
what values these options offer for couples.  
This study makes a novel claim: the doctrines that govern prenuptial and 
cohabitation arrangements enforce these agreements in a formalist, 
proceduralist manner.
13
 The law purports to balance competing values but, in 
fact, adheres to rules and formalities over standards and substance. For 
instance, the doctrine nullifies agreements when formalities are not met and 
reduces the court’s discretion to evaluate a contract’s fairness.14 Similarly, 
default rules often favor the economically stronger partner and disadvantage 
the vulnerable party—often the partner who invested more in the household 
at the expense of career development.
15
 This system resembles the way that 
classical contract theory has often worked for the advancement of the 
economically stronger party.
16
 Consequently, building on another body of 
scholarship in contract law,
17
 I call this trend “neoclassical.”  
The neoclassical approach in intrafamilial contracts plays a double role. 
In the doctrines governing prenuptial contracts, it serves to protect the 
freedom of contract of the economically stronger party. Therefore, in some 
jurisdictions, the doctrine takes a strong pro-enforcement stance, increasing 
the predictability of enforcement. Conversely, in the law of cohabitation 
contracts, the neoclassical approach functions to protect the freedom from 
contract of the economically empowered partner.
18
 By imposing formalities to 
create binding obligations between unmarried partners and instituting default 
rules that bar financial obligations without contracts, the doctrine ensures 
that the parties do not make commitments involuntarily.  
The choice within informal relationships and marriage, considered alone, 
does not tell the whole story about the values embedded in the system  
 
 
family law that I critique: courts insisting on the use of ex-ante bargaining notions to find 
obligations between cohabiting couples. 
13 
Some scholars still maintain that prenuptial agreements afford stronger protection 
than other commercial contracts. They have not yet noticed the emerging neoclassical 
trend that diminishes these protections by focusing more on procedural safeguards. Thus, 
some literatures assume that contractual family law already encompasses a pluralistic 
approach because the doctrines that govern intrafamilial contracts reflect a different 
balance of values than other sorts of contracts do (by providing expansive protections to 
vulnerable parties). See Hanoch Dagan, Autonomy, Pluralism, and Contract Law Theory, 
76 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 19, 33 (2013). As I show in Part II.B, while it is still true that many 
states employ heightened standards for evaluating the fairness of prenuptials, the new 
trend is toward diminishing these stricter requirements, at least in terms of substantive 
fairness.  
14
 See Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. 
REV. 1685, 1729 (1976).  
15 
See infra Parts II.B–C.  
16  
Ralph James Mooney, The New Conceptualism in Contract Law, 74 OR. L. REV. 
1131, 1135 (1995) (“[A] legal system that emphasizes freedom of contract . . . works 
ultimately to the benefit of the already rich and powerful.” (footnote omitted)).  
17 
See Jay M. Feinman, The Significance of Contract Theory, 58 U. CIN. L. REV. 1283, 
1285 (1990) (“The word ‘neoclassical’ . . . indicat[es] that neoclassical contract has not so 
far departed from classical law that a wholly new name is appropriate.”).  
18 
See infra Parts II.B–C (describing the development in doctrines governing prenuptial 
and cohabitation contracts).  
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as a whole. I thus put these legal institutions in perspective by examining the 
whole regulatory regime together. My conclusion, visualized in Table 1,
19
 is 
that the overall regulatory structure systematically provides significant 
freedom for the wealthier party to skirt the financial responsibility to support 
an ex-partner while limiting protections for the less-well-off partner.
20
  
Thus, I contend that structural pluralism, in its current form, is a cover for 
market logic and inequality, or, at the least, that it lends itself to a free-market 
approach. Further, the reincarnation of privatization under the disguise of 
pluralism is not a coincidence. Rather, pluralism is construed in a way that 
invites the incorporation of neoclassical principles. That is, the theory’s 
plasticity and commitment to personal autonomy make it a comfortable 
ground for adoption of laissez-faire policies that advantage the economically 
superior partners, and create a false sense of security that there is, indeed, 
“effective choice” in the name of pluralism.  
Finally, I explore whether it is possible for family law to advance a truly 
pluralistic vision of family regulation. I assert that as long as the menu of 
options is predicated on notions of private ordering and ex-ante bargaining, 
then, regardless of how many options we have, the powerful party is going to 
triumph over the less-empowered one. That is, the shortcomings of the 
pluralistic system are to some extent unavoidable in any regime that uses 
private rulemaking to “supplement” marriage. I suggest that a truly pluralistic 
law needs to be bounded by other core values such as substantive notions 
of autonomy and equality.
21
  
The Article is structured as follows. Part I frames the transition of family 
law from an era of privatization to an era of pluralism and introduces the 
basic assumptions of pluralistic theory as pertaining to family law. Part II lays 
out a functional analysis of the values embedded by cohabitation and 
prenuptial agreements—with an emphasis on the neoclassical nature their 
doctrines are starting to adopt. Part III takes a panoptic view of the 
interaction between the various institutions that family law offers and asserts 
that the system fails to promote a balance of values. Part IV provides a 
critique of family law pluralism and proposes a few baselines for the 
development of a truly pluralistic vision of family law. The Conclusion 
suggests the need to move toward a neopluralist theory of family law—one 




See infra Table 1. 
20 
See infra Part III. 
21 
See infra Part IV (arguing that such structure is likely to include registration 
schemes that are substantially different from marriage, change of default rules, and 
adequate protections from strategic behavior).  
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I. FROM PRIVATIZATION TO PLURALISM? 
 
 
Pluralistic theory is on the rise in private law scholarship generally,
22
  
and now dominates the discussion in family law as well.
23
  “Pluralism” takes 
a few different meanings and definitions in family law.
24
 During the 1990s, 
pluralism, in the family law context, was used mainly to describe different 
groups and their diverse community norms concerning marriage and family 
life.
25
  This Part examines how pluralism evolved into a term that is used in 
connection with choice and individual autonomy. It provides a modest 
genealogy of the shift from status to contract that preceded the supposed era 
of pluralism. 
The embracing of private ordering by family law is not a new 
phenomenon. It is part of a larger process, commonly referred to as the 
“privatization of family law”—a development that started almost fifty years 
ago.
26
 Legal scholarship is not entirely coherent on the link between the 
privatization process and the newer pluralistic development: what are the 
differences between privatization and pluralism? Was the privatization 
process replaced by pluralism?
27 
This Part aims to provide an account that 





See, e.g., Steven J. Burton, Normative Legal Theories: The Case for Pluralism and 
Balancing, 98 IOWA L. REV. 535, 538 (2013) (“[A]ll normative legal theories should be 
pluralist.”); Hanoch Dagan, Pluralism and Perfectionism in Private Law, 112 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1409, 1435 (2012); Roy Kreitner, On the New Pluralism in Contract Theory, 45 
SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 915, 915 (2012); Bertram Lomfeld, Contract as Deliberation, 76 
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 8 (2013) (“A newer camp of scholars offers genuine pluralistic 
multi-value theories of contract law.” (footnote omitted)). 
23 
See, e.g., Jessica R. Feinberg, Avoiding Marriage Tunnel Vision, 88 TUL. L. REV. 
257, 259–60 (2013) (advocating for pluralistic progression in family law); Melissa Murray, 
After Lawrence, BALKINIZATION (Jan. 15, 2013), http://balkin.blogspot.com/2013/01/ after-
lawrence.html [https://perma.cc/7YR4-RDB3] (“If same-sex marriage was among the first 
generation of issues to emerge in Lawrence’s wake, hopefully relationship recognition 
pluralism will be among its second-generation progeny.”); see also Linda C. McClain, 
Marriage Pluralism in the United States: On Civil and Religious Jurisdiction and the 
Demands of Equal Citizenship, in MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE IN A MULTI-CULTURAL CONTEXT: 
MULTI-TIERED MARRIAGE AND THE BOUNDARIES OF CIVIL LAW AND RELIGION 309, 309–10 
(Joel A. Nichols ed., 2012) [hereinafter MARRIAGE IN A MULTI-CULTURAL CONTEXT] (arguing 
that “‘legal pluralism’ is hot” and examining what legal pluralism means in family law). 
24
 McClain, supra note 23, at 309.  
25 
One popular strain of scholarship in family law addresses the plurality of legal 
sources that direct society, including religious tribunals and custom. Id. at 309–10; see 
also Joel A. Nichols, Comment, Louisiana’s Covenant Marriage Law: A First Step Toward 
A More Robust Pluralism in Marriage and Divorce Law?, 47 EMORY L.J. 929, 932 
(1998) (advocating for “robust pluralism,” which entails “state openness to and respect 
for the internal norms and regulations of various faith traditions regarding marriage and 
divorce”). As explained below, I focus here on a different kind of legal pluralism and do 
not address the topic of religious diversity. 
26 
Jana B. Singer, The Privatization of Family Law, 1992 WIS. L. REV. 1443, 1444 
(1992). 
27 
Brian Bix, for example, considers the expansion of private ordering as one of four 
different developments that contribute (or could contribute) to the development of pluralistic 
and more decentralized family law (the other three are: delegation to religious communities, 
establishment of menus of options, and allowing couples the choice of law to  
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the connection between privatization and pluralism. To do this, it is useful to 
briefly recount the privatization process that preceded and contributed to the 
development of the supposed pluralistic shift. 
In the past half century, family law has undergone a growing process of 
privatization. The transformation of marriage—from an institution with 
strong status characteristics to an institution with increasingly more 
contractual components—was most notable in the rise of no-fault divorce, 
which permits parties to exit the marital relationship without a showing that 
the other spouse committed some type of marital fault.
28
 This progression 
was further characterized by the replacing of most mandatory rules that were 
part of the marriage contract with default rules, which allows partners to 
define many aspects of their marriage contract.
29 
This process was accompanied by an age-old debate between 
supporters of traditional marriage and scholars who viewed contracts as 
“variable, private, and controlled by the will of the parties not that of the 
state.”30 The former group argued that allowing spouses to tailor their 
obligations would increase opportunistic behavior and lead to marriage 
instability.
31
 For them, it is the state—not the parties themselves—that has 
the control, and should maintain the control, to prescribe the obligations and 
privileges attendant to marriage.
32
 The latter group viewed contracts as 
synonymous with individual autonomy.
33
 Although several scholars have 
offered sophisticated critiques of private ordering as representative of the 
partners’ will,34 more commentators now salute the extended private 





govern their relationships). Brian H. Bix, Pluralism and Decentralization in Marriage 
Regulation, in MARRIAGE IN A MULTI-CULTURAL CONTEXT, supra note 23, 60, 64–66.  
28
 See Elizabeth S. Scott & Robert E. Scott, Marriage as Relational Contract, 84 VA. 
L. REV. 1225, 1235 (1998). This is not to say that the state released all control over this 
aspect, as spouses still seek the state’s approval in order to dissolve the marriage. 
29 
Eskridge, supra note 1, at 1902.  
30
 Janet Halley, Behind the Law of Marriage (I): From Status/Contract to the Marriage 
System, 6 UNBOUND: HARV. J. LEGAL LEFT 1, 4 (2010). 
31 
See, e.g., Scott & Scott, supra note 28, at 1245 (presenting the arguments of com-  
munitarians regarding contractualization of family relations); Carol Weisbrod, The Way 
We Live Now: A Discussion of Contracts and Domestic Arrangements, 1994 UTAH L. 
REV. 777, 779; Jennifer Wriggins, Marriage Law and Family Law: Autonomy, 
Interdependence, and Couples of the Same Gender, 41 B.C. L. REV. 265, 265–66 (2000). 
Other commentators argue that contractual approach to family law is always problematic 
because parties do not tend to think in contractual terms. See, e.g., Ira Mark Ellman, 
“Contract Thinking” Was Marvin’s Fatal Flaw, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1365, 1367 (2001). 
32
 See Singer, supra note 26, at 1446; Katharine B. Silbaugh, Marriage Contracts  
and the Family Economy, 93 NW. U. L. REV. 65, 111–18 (1998). 
33
 See Halley, supra note 30, at 15 (“[T]he onset of contractual freedom between  
spouses is seen as necessary for marriage to be free and equal.” (footnote omitted)). 
34 
See, e.g., Robin West, Authority, Autonomy, and Choice: The Role of Consent in 
the Moral and Political Visions of Franz Kafka and Richard Posner, 99 HARV. L. REV. 
384, 384–85 (1985). 
35
 See, e.g., Martha M. Ertman, Exchange as a Cornerstone in Families, 34 W. NEW 
ENG. L. REV. 405, 443–44 (2012) (concluding that the law should extend more opportunities 
for private ordering).  
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Recently, some scholars maintain, family law reached the era of pluralism, 
both descriptively and normatively.
36
 Although scholarship does not address 
this issue directly, the privatization process described above could be 
characterized as a transition period that preceded the pluralistic progress-
sion.
37
 Distinguishing between the process of privatization and the 
progression toward pluralism is not easy, among other reasons because 
scholars use the term “pluralism” in different ways, sometimes ambiguously 
and without clear definitions.
38
 And because private ordering is itself an 
element of this pluralistic development (meaning, the pluralistic progression 
is expressed, among other ways, with the growth of options for private 
ordering). 
Nevertheless, trying to account for this transition descriptively, the 
expansion of options for legal recognition of relationships constitutes the 
main development that demonstrates the assumed transformation from 
privatization to pluralism.
39
 As a result of efforts to legalize same-sex 
marriage, a few states now offer (or offered) more institutions for registration 
of relationships, sometimes even open to nonintimate partners.
40 
The dual 
development of an increased enforcement of private ordering and of multiple 
registration schemes, coupled with the diverse family structures that exist 
today in the U.S.,
41
 is the primary demonstration of the rise of structural 
pluralism in family law: the idea that, in the past century, American family law 




 See, e.g., Bix, supra note 27, at 61; David J. Herzig, Marriage Pluralism: Taxing 
Marriage After Windsor, 36 CARDOZO L. REV. 1, 3 (2014) (“Family law has accommodated 
the new social pluralism through the creation of various new institutions to formalize 
cohabitation among both same-sex and heterosexual couples.” (footnote omitted)). 
37
 Cf. Singer, supra note 26, at 1565 (suggesting that the privatization process could 
serve as a “useful stepping stone to imagining and implementing a more just form of public 
ordering”). 
38
 See, e.g., Bix, supra note 27, at 60 (arguing that pluralism as expressed by “grow- 
ing diversity and decentralization of marriage options . . . could be a good idea.”). Bix, 
however, does not define the term “pluralism”, but only provides alternative paths to 
pluralism by focusing on different developments that lead to what I call structural pluralism. 
See id.  
39 
Erez Aloni, Deprivative Recognition, 61 UCLA L. REV. 1276, 1302–09 (2014); see 
also Eskridge, supra note 1, at 1884.  
40
 These registration schemes vary in their scope and the level of obligations and 
rights they confer. For instance, in some states (Illinois, Hawaii) they are open to same and 
opposite-sex couples, while in others they are limited to same-sex couples only (New 
Jersey). See Aloni, supra note 1, at 591–93.  
Eskridge also includes within the expansion process the opportunities to live in 
nonregistered relationships and still incur some legal consequences; for example, the 
option to cohabit (which was criminally prohibited in the past). Eskridge argues that “[i]n an 
increasing number of states, cohabitation has become a reasonably coherent legal regime 
that is not just a private alternative to marriage but is also a regulatory alternative to civil 
marriage.” Eskridge, supra note 1, at 1934–35. While it is true that in all but three states 
contracts concerning the financial aspects of relationships are generally enforceable, these 
regimes still present significant legal problems. I analyze the shortcoming of cohabitation 
agreements in Part II. C. See also Aloni, supra note 1, at 587 (discussing the short- coming 
of establishing financial obligations between unmarried partners based on contractual 
elements). 
41
 Eskridge, supra note 1, at 1892–94.   
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of options for romantic couples, including those with children.”42 Bill Eskridge 
observes that “American family law has long been more pluralistic than 
most academics, virtually all policymakers, and all partisans have made it 
out to be.”43 As stated before, several scholars have scrutinized the view that 
multiple registration schemes—as construed in the U.S.—enhance 
meaningful choice.
44
 The critique of the shortcomings of registration 
schemes is familiar; in any event, it is safe to say that, at this point, the 
supposed pluralism is presented primarily by ex-ante contractual elements. I 
focus, then, on the other element of the alleged pluralism: the greater room 
for variety and choice within each regime; i.e., the contractual component. 
Indeed, within this shift to structural pluralism, private ordering plays a 
significant role.
45
 Consequently, contract is the main tool that makes these 
regulatory regimes more flexible and tailored to the specific needs of the 
parties—not one-size-fits-all.
46
 For instance, marriage offers more plasticity 
once partners have the option to choose covenant marriage or to execute a 
prenuptial agreement.
47
 Private ordering also extends choice without any 




 Bix, supra note 27, at 60, 64; Eskridge, supra note 1, at 1889. To be sure, Eskridge  
acknowledges that the current menu of options is incoherent and developed without 
systematic thought by the legislature. He thus advocates for its improvement and further 
development. Eskridge, supra note 1, at 1891.  
43
 Eskridge, supra note 1, at 1947.  
44
 Elsewhere, I argued that these registration schemes—while they have the potential 
to serve as useful options for regulation of relationships and for a variety of family 
structures—fail to provide meaningful choices because they do not address the concerns of 
people who live in nonmarital unions. See Aloni, supra note 1, at 591–94. Mary Anne  
Case further observed, soon after these registration schemes appeared, that the 
registration schemes that existed then actually decreased the choices open to couples by 
adopting requirements (such as proof of cohabitation or financial support obligations 
between the partners) that were not required in order to obtain a marriage license. Mary 
Anne Case, Marriage Licenses, 89 MINN. L. REV. 1758, 1772–74 (2005). More recently, 
Janet Halley suggested that the evolving menu of options for recognition of relationships is 
“less emphatic about choice, more regulatory, more governmental in the Foucaultian sense 
than a real menu of options.” Halley, supra note 30, at 22, 33 (footnote omitted). Halley 
contends that these legal institutions incrementally adopt marriage-like characteristics, and 
if a couple chooses not to adopt one of them, the state can still ascribe financial obligations 
to them, thus leaving less room for choice. Id. at 22; see also Melissa Murray, Paradigms 
Lost: How Domestic Partnership Went from Innovation to Injury, 37 N.Y.U. REV. 
L. & SOC. CHANGE 291, 296-300 (2013) (arguing that once domestic partnership became 
marriage with a different name it lost its transformative value). 
45 
E.g., Michael J. Trebilcock & Rosemin Keshvani, The Role of Private Ordering in 
Family Law: A Law and Economics Perspective, 41 U. TORONTO L.J. 533, 535 (1991) 
(arguing that private ordering in family law is justified by increasingly secular and pluralistic 
perception); Bix, supra note 27, at 64–66; see also Bruce C. Hafen, The Constitu-  
tional Status of Marriage, Kinship, and Sexual Privacy—Balancing the Individual and 
Social Interests, 81 MICH. L. REV. 463, 487 (1983) (“The claims arising from such an 
unlimited spectrum of relationships would necessarily be contractual in nature, with no 
overtones of Status as a source of obligation.”). 
46
 Aloni, supra note 1, at 607–09.  
47 
See, e.g., Lifshitz, supra note 5, at 1633–34 (arguing that covenant marriage fits  
that pluralistic approach to family law because it extends the marital options).  
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about it without registering their relationships.
48
 Private ordering in family 
law, the argument goes, thus serves (and should serve) to extend people’s 
choices in organizing their relationships, in a way that reflects that couples 
structure their relationships in different shapes and sizes.  
Normatively, family law pluralism means more than privatization. 
Accordingly, the state must proactively promote choices that are as diverse 
as possible (as long as these options are useful). The pluralistic paradigm 
also assigns a different role for states’ regulation of relationships: from 
establishing the norms that are attendant to marriage, to serving “primarily as 
supportive of individual and community ideas of marriage (within limits).”49 
But these descriptive and normative accounts of pluralism are 
unsatisfying. I argue that, to date, family scholarship has failed to provide 
coherent definition to family law pluralism.
50
 Some scholars use the term to 
describe a movement away from marriage as the only regulatory regime 
(and one hard to modify) and toward a variety of regulatory regimes 
characterized by default and override rules.
51
 But if this is the definition of 
pluralism, then how is it substantially different from privatization?
52
 
Additionally, this definition falls short of indicating what types of values 
should be embedded in and distributed by such menu.
53
 For example, 





 See Stake, supra note 6, at 818.  
49 
Bix, supra note 27, at 61.  
50 
A specific application of autonomy-based pluralism in family law is offered by 
Shahar Lifshitz, but while he intends it to provide general guidance to family law, at this 
stage, the particular work is focused on a pluralistic legal approach to regulation of laws 
pertaining to unmarried couples. Lifshitz, supra note 5, at 1567 (“This Article addresses the 
regulation of economic relationships between unmarried cohabitants . . . . ”). He offers a 
normative theory that supports his claim that the legal regulation of cohabiting couples, and 
to a larger extent family law generally, should follow pluralistic principles. Id. According to 
Lifshitz, pluralistic theory in family law stems from the principle that the state should support 
individual autonomy by creating different legal institutions that reflect the different types of 
relationships. Id. at 1568–70. Based on these principles, he offers a unique legal institution 
of cohabitation that results in a set of legal consequences that correlate with the type of 
cohabitation. Id. at 1601–25.  
51
 Eskridge, supra note 1, at 1889–91. Other times, the term refers to a descriptive  
(not normative) shorthand for legal tolerance, acceptance, recognition, and encouragement 
of a variety of family forms and variations within particular family forms. See Feinberg, 
supra note 23, at 259 (defining “pluralistic relationship recognition” as “the needs of the 
diverse relationship and familial forms in existence today without regard to marriage 
eligibility”); id. at 258–60, 279–85. Such definition is typically accompanied by the 
assumption that structural pluralism—including private ordering—reflects a positive 
development.  
52 
See generally Singer, supra note 26, at 1446–47 (characterizing privatization as 
recognizing relationships other than marriage and allowing the partners themselves to 
determine the consequences of their marital status).  
53 
Eskridge’s pluralism is essentially a vehicle to achieve other utilitarian goals. For 
Eskridge, pluralism entails “a regime where there is more individual choice, but that choice 
is channeled, or guided, by governmental nudges rather than by hard governmental 
shoves.” Eskridge, supra note 1, at 1893 (footnote omitted). Eskridge submits that family 
law serves three main goals, which sometimes are at odds: encouraging committed 
relationships, creating an efficient and low-cost decision-making mechanism, and 
protecting vulnerable persons. Id. at 1946–47. Family law pluralism, he posits, supports 
achieving a balance between these goals. Id. at 1950.
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that the state has to provide as many options as possible (free market), or to 
try to provide a choice that still has a channeling effect, or to provide only 
limited choice for the type of partnership that the state wants to encourage.
54
 
Finally, even if one agrees on the definition and goal of family law pluralism, 
we still have to examine whether the developing structure actually achieves 
its goals—or progresses in that direction. Thus, an additional gap in legal 
scholarship that this Article aims to fill is an exploration of whether the 
expansion of choice—structural pluralism—truly reflects pluralistic values. 
And if the currently emerging structural pluralism does not reflect pluralistic 
values, the question arises as to whether such an agenda is even 
achievable, or whether pluralism is a suitable framework for family law 
theory.  
While family law scholarship has failed to probe the aims of structural 
pluralism, scholars from other legal fields have put forward elaborate 
theories of the definition and role of pluralism in private law that can provide 
a productive basis for similar exploration in family law.
55
 Hanoch Dagan, in a 
book and numerous articles,
56
 advances the most developed of such 
theories. Dagan’s pluralistic theory relies on three paradigms of pluralism: 
structural, value, and autonomy-based.
57
 Structural pluralism, as explained 
above, is the vehicle that serves to advance pluralistic values. Value 
pluralism argues that as the world is composed of a plurality of universal 
goods, these goods cannot be ranked (incommensurable), and that often 
there is conflict between them.
58
 Dagan’s autonomy-based theory is strongly 
influenced by Joseph Raz’s notion of autonomy. According to Raz, in order 
for people to selfgovern, they must have adequate and meaningful choices.
59
 
Dagan then endorses a view that the pluralistic approach is grounded in 
respect for diverse values or different balances of values, and in promoting 
autonomy that can only be achieved by facilitating adequate and meaningful 
choices between options.  
When it comes to contracts, Dagan asserts that contract law already 
embodies such structural, autonomy-based pluralism and should further 
develop in this direction. Contract law is ideal as an embodiment of pluralistic 
theory because it “is an umbrella of a diverse set of institutions, and each 




 See Aloni, supra note 1, at 599–601 (contending that the menu-of-option plan is not 
coherent enough).  
55
 Gregory S. Alexander, Pluralism and Property, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 1017, 1024–35 
(2011) (describing four property theorists and uncovering their commitment to value 
pluralism).  
56
 E.g., HANOCH DAGAN, PROPERTY: VALUES AND INSTITUTIONS (2011) (suggesting a 
pluralistic theory of property in service of liberal values); Dagan, supra note 13, at 19–20.  
57
 Dagan, supra note 22, at 1421–29.  
58
 GEORGE CROWDER, LIBERALISM AND VALUE PLURALISM 44–56 (2002) (defining “value 
pluralism” based on four elements: (1) universal values (2) plurality (3) incommensurability 
(4) in conflict); WILLIAM A. GALSTON, LIBERAL PLURALISM: THE IMPLICATIONS OF VALUE 
PLURALISM FOR POLITICAL THEORY AND PRACTICE 5–6 (2002).  
59 
RAZ, supra note 5, at 398–99.   
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cates a distinct balance of values in accordance with its characteristic 
subject matter and the ideal type of relationships it anticipates.”60  
Dagan further states that a particular example in which contract law 
already encompasses such pluralism is family law contracts—such as 
premarital contracts and separation agreements. Family law contracts are 
emblematic of a pluralistic approach because different rules govern the 
enforceability of such family-related contracts in a way that reflects the 
unique values underpinning them.
61
 While Dagan does not purport to explore 
the role of pluralism in family law, he often makes reference to this area.
62
 
For instance, he repeatedly refers to marriage and family contracts as prime 
examples of areas that already show some degree of pluralism and will 
benefit from further embracing pluralistic principles.
63
  
In what follows, I build on and extrapolate from Dagan’s work and 
evaluate its suitability to family law to examine whether private ordering in 
family law advances the principles of value pluralism. That is, I explore 
whether the growing private ordering in family law provides effective choice 
and embodies a balance of values and whether it is progressing in that 
direction. In particular, in the next Part, I review which values are integrated 
into each type of family law contract.  
 
II. NEOCLASSICAL REALITY 
 
This Part uses functional analysis to examine which values take 
precedence in contracts that regulate the financial obligations between 
intimate partners. A functional analysis focuses both on how the structure of 
law shapes the parties’ use of such contracts and on distributional concerns 
resulting from this structure. It enquires into who employs the contracts, who 
has the incentive to enter into such contracts, which promises are enforced, 
and what impact the bargaining process and default rules have on the 
contracts’ content.  
Particularly, I look at two types of family law contracts that are often 
treated as distinct but today reflect neoclassical contract principles: 
premarital and cohabitation agreements. I focus on these two because, in 
both, the doctrinal changes that govern their enforceability have been 
significant and rapid, and because both are symbolic of the emerging 
structural pluralism in family law. It is important to note, however, that 
although I explore these two types of agreements, similar principles are 
embedded in separation contracts
64






 Dagan, supra note 13, at 20.  
61
 Id. at 35.  
62
 Dagan, supra note 22, at 1435.  
63
 E.g., id.  
64
 See Penelope Eileen Bryan, Women’s Freedom to Contract at Divorce: A Mask for 
Contextual Coercion, 47 BUFF. L. REV. 1153, 1270 (1999) (arguing that in the context of 
separation contracts “[u]nder the pretense of respect for the autonomy and the equality
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Since I conclude that the doctrines governing family law contracts adopt 
neoclassical characteristics, I begin by laying out the basic principles of the 
neoclassical approach in contract law. Section A thus introduces basic 
principles of classical contract theory and its progeny, the neoclassicist 
approach. Section B investigates the values that have unfolded in premarital 
agreements. Section C then studies the values that enfold contractual 
principles that regulate the obligations between unmarried partners.  
 
A. The Foundational Assumptions of Neoclassical Contract Theory 
 
Classical contract theory posits a regulatory apparatus grounded on the 
clear intent of the parties to enter into the contract and, once a valid 
contractual obligation is created, holding the parties strictly to their bargain.
66
 
In other words, the rules of classical contract theory make “contractual 
liability hard to assume and hard to escape once it is assumed.”67 Classical 
theory relies on formal requirements—such as writing and consideration—as 
conditions to make the promise legally binding.
68
 Once these requirements 




In effect, the principles of classical contract theory give individuals 
considerable power regarding their commitments while taking that power 
from the courts.
70
 By instituting formal, acontextual, and rigid rules of 
formation and excuse, the system principally curtails the discretion of the 
judge and the jury, diminishes their ability to exercise their personal views, 
and forces them to adhere to the rules.
71
 Rather than use a case-by-case 
approach to inquire into the contract’s fairness, classical theory is grounded 
in stability and predictability. The trade-off for this is that such a system binds  
 
 
of women, contract doctrine and its application provide no remedy and leave women mired 
in financial despair and resentment”).  
65
 Traditionally, and still today, courts are reluctant to enforce postnuptial agreements, 
and scrutinize them more critically than prenuptial contracts. See Hoffman v. Dobbins, No. 
24633 2009 WL 3119635, at *2 (Ohio Ct. App. Sept. 30, 2009) (“Postnuptial agreements, 
with specific limited exceptions, are not valid in Ohio.” (citation omitted)); Sean Hannon 
Williams, Postnuptial Agreements, 2007 WIS. L. REV. 827, 829 (2007). Nevertheless, 
recently there is more of a tendency to uphold postnuptial agreements and equalize the 
tests for their enforceability with those of prenuptials. Moreover, the recently promulgated 
Uniform Premarital and Marital Agreements Act specifically applies to postnuptial 
agreements and subjects them to the same requirements as premarital agreements. UNIF. 
PREMARITAL AND MARITAL AGREEMENTS ACT § 2(2) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2013) 
(defining marital agreement as “an agreement between spouses intending to remain 
married”).  
66 
GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 52–53 (Ronald K.L. Collins ed., 
2d ed. 1995); Franklin G. Snyder & Ann M. Mirabito, The Death of Contracts, 52 DUQ. L. 
REV. 345, 362 (2014).  
67
 Robert E. Scott, The Death of Contract Law, 54 U. TORONTO L.J. 369, 372 (2004).  
68 
Id. at 371.  
69
 GILMORE, supra note 66, at 50–53.  
70
 Snyder & Mirabito, supra note 66, at 362.  
71 
See Feinman, supra note 17, at 1286–87.   
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individuals to their bargain with very limited regard to the fairness of the deal, 
changed circumstances, relative bargaining power, or specific circumstances 
of the case.
72
 Indeed, “[c]lassical contract doctrine generally makes little 
concession for the bargaining power inequalities that plague consumers.”73 
Neoclassical contract theory emerged as a critique of the classical 
approach. 
74
 It rests on a balance between the classical contractual 
principles— freedom of contracts and efficiency—with other values, including 
fairness.
75
 The neoclassical approach adopts doctrines that are more flexible 
and pragmatic. Like its predecessor, the approach is still grounded in 
concepts such as “assent,” but it is more likely to address the realities of the 
parties and their dealings.
76
 This approach defines the current mainstream 
theory in contract law.
77
 However, as implied by its name, neoclassical 
contract law has not significantly departed from classical contract theory.
78
 It 
is still founded on the assumption that individuals are relatively autonomous 
and undertake commitments under state intervention that ensures fairness.
79
 
Such contract law still assumes, sometimes incorrectly, that contracting 
parties act rationally, and it is generally pro-enforcement of the bargain.
80
  
As I show below, the characteristics of neoclassical contract law are 
gradually appearing in the area of family-focused contracts. While the 
general structure of the law embodies the main principles of classical 
contract theory—such as adherence to rules, formalism, curtailing judges’ 
discretion, and limiting alternative theories of recovery such as quasi-




Jay M. Feinman, Un-Making Law: The Classical Revival in the Common Law, 28 
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1, 16 (2004) (“The solution to these problems is to revert to a simple 
model of contract based on an ideal market, strictly enforcing the bargains that parties 
make . . . and certainly not evaluating the bargains for fairness.”).  
73
 Melissa T. Lonegrass, Finding Room for Fairness in Formalism—the Sliding Scale 
Approach to Unconscionability, 44 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 1, 50 (2012).  
74 
John E. Murray, Jr., Contract Theories and the Rise of Neoformalism, 71 
FORDHAM L. REV. 869, 870 (2002).  
75 
Feinman, supra note 17, at 1288.  
76 
Jay M. Feinman, Contract After the Fall, 39 STAN. L. REV. 1537, 1538 (1987).  
77 
Feinman, supra note 17, at 1285; G. Richard Shell, Contracts in the Modern 
Supreme Court, 81 CAL. L. REV. 431, 496 (1993) (“Most scholars agree that, as a matter 
of descriptive fact, our era is dominated by this neoclassical realist model, which is 
characterized by a pragmatic mix of both firm rules and open-ended standards.” (footnote 
omitted)).  
78
 Feinman, supra note 17, at 1285.  
79
 Id. at 1309–10; Andrew Robertson, The Limits of Voluntariness in Contract, 29 
MELB. U. L. REV. 179, 182 (2005) (“The cornerstone of the neoclassic conception of 
contract is the idea that contractual obligations are voluntarily undertaken by contracting 
parties.”); see also Blake D. Morant, Law, Literature, and Contract: An Essay in Realism, 4 
MICH. J. RACE & L. 1, 12–17 (1998) (criticizing the neoclassical approach for lack of 
treatment of racial and gender bias in contractual relationships).  
80
 See Danielle Kie Hart, Contract Law Now—Reality Meets Legal Fictions, 41 U. 
BALT. L. REV. 1, 13 (2011) (arguing that neoclassical contract law—which she calls 
“modern”—still retains the main characteristics of classical legal theory). Some scholars 
view the neoclassical theory of contracts as taking a drastic distance from classical contract 
theory and incorporating a strong nonformalistic approach to contract principles. According 
to this account, modern courts have rejected the neoclassical approach in favor of a pro-
market approach to contract enforcement. See Shell, supra note 77, at 495–519.   
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theory. This is because, as I describe below, the system displays attempts to 
balance between competing principles, and it is more flexible than classical 
contract theory. Yet, the neoclassical approach is still deeply grounded in the 
principles of voluntariness and autonomy and adherence to rules over 
standards, as analyzed in the following sections.  
 
B. Prenuptial Agreements 
 
In this Part, I use functional analysis to explore the values that are 
promoted by the use of premarital contracts. I outline the evaluation of 
enforceability of premarital contracts in Subsection 1. In Subsection 2, I 
survey and analyze the default rules of marriage dissolution. In the third 
Subsection, I give a functional analysis.  
 
 1. Enforceability  
 
The evolution of doctrines governing the enforceability of premarital 
contracts can be roughly compartmentalized into three stages.
81
 The first 
stage, the common law phase, extends from the early 1970s until the 
drafting of the Uniform Premarital Agreement Act (“UPAA”) in 1983.82 In this 
stage, courts moved from a policy of absolutely declining to enforce 
premarital contracts regarding the consequences of divorce to a regime of 
limited enforceability, characterized by strong caution in enforcement.
83
 In 
the second stage, the UPAA stage—from the passage of the UPAA until 
recently— states have varied greatly in their approaches. Roughly divided, 
some states have treated premarital contracts similarly to conventional 
contracts, thus adopting pro-enforcement approaches.
84
 In other states, 




 Because states vary widely in their approaches to enforcement of premarital 
contracts, this is a very rough division. See J. Thomas Oldham, With All My Worldly Goods 
I Thee Endow, or Maybe Not: A Reevaluation of the Uniform Premarital Agreement Act 
After Three Decades, 19 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 83, 83–84 (2011) (stating that there 
are substantial differences between states’ approaches to enforcement of premarital 
agreements). Despite this shortcoming, this categorization is helpful in observing the 
emergence of a neoclassical approach, compared with the other approaches. Jeffrey G. 
Sherman offered a somewhat similar evolutionary categorization by identifying three 
“significant events in the shift toward routine enforcement of all prenuptial agreements . . . .” 
Jeffrey G. Sherman, Prenuptial Agreements: A New Reason to Revive an Old Rule, 53 
CLEV. ST. L. REV. 359, 394 (2006) (identifying the three significant events as: the Posner 
case (1970), the Uniform Premarital Agreement Act (1983), and the Simeone case (1990)). 
His analysis, however, is slightly dated, as his article was published before a few recent 
significant events that I consider here as part of the third stage.  
82
 UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1983).  
83
 See Margaret Ryznar & Anna Stepie˜n-Sporek, To Have and to Hold, for Richer or 
Richer: Premarital Agreements in the Comparative Context, 13 CHAP. L. REV. 27, 35 
(2009).  
84
 See Brian Bix, Bargaining in the Shadow of Love: The Enforcement of Premarital 
Agreements and How We Think About Marriage, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 145, 154–156 
(1998).   
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a heightened burden for their enforceability (strong procedural and 
substantive fairness).
85
 In the third stage, the neoclassical stage, which has 
just started unfolding, a new approach has started to emerge: legislators and 
courts have begun to desert the substantive review of prenuptial agreements 
and to adopt strong procedural safeguards, attempting to protect the 
economically weaker party while increasing predictability of enforcement and 
restraining judges’ discretion. The current New Jersey legislation and the 
Uniform Premarital and Marital Agreements Act (“UPMAA”) are emblematic 
of these changes. Below, I discuss these three stages. The account of 




Until the seventies, courts declared premarital agreements concerning 
divorce planning unenforceable on the grounds that they violated public 
policy by encouraging divorce.
87
 Thus, only premarital agreements affecting 
the distribution of property upon the future spouse’s death were enforceable. 
However, at the beginning of the 1970s, courts started to uphold premarital 
contracts concerning the obligations of the spouses upon divorce.
88
 Still, 
most courts examined the fairness of prenuptial agreements more closely 
than they would have under general contractual principles.
89
 In other words, 
courts have employed both procedural and substantive tests to examine the 
fairness of prenuptials, including a close inquiry of fairness at the time of 
enforcement (as distinguished from the time of execution)—a.k.a., 
“secondlook” provisions.90  
The second stage began with the promulgation of the Uniform Premarital 
Agreement Act in 1983.
91
 The Act, or some portions of it, was adopted by 
twenty-two states and the District of Columbia;
92
 it embraced a strong 
proenforcement approach.
93
 The Act “facilitates treatment of premarital 
agreement as essentially ordinary contracts . . . [and] reduces the high 




 See Oldham, supra note 81, at 88.  
86
 For excellent reviews of the development of enforcement of prenuptial agreements, 
see Silbaugh, supra note 32, at 70–75 and Bix, supra note 84, at 145, 148–58.  
87 
Silbaugh, supra note 32, at 72–73.  
88
 See, e.g., Posner v. Posner, 233 So. 2d 381 (Fla. 1970); Unander v. Unander, 506 
P.2d 719 (Or. 1973). 
89
 Bix, supra note 86, at 154.  
90
 See, e.g., Button v. Button, 388 N.W.2d 546, 552 (Wis. 1986) (“If, however, there 
are significantly changed circumstances after the execution of an agreement and the 
agreement as applied at divorce no longer comports with the reasonable expectations of 
the parties, an agreement which is fair at execution may be unfair to the parties at 
divorce.”); see also Mallen v. Mallen, 622 S.E.2d 812, 814 (Ga. 2005) (explaining that in 
evaluating antenuptial contracts courts consider whether the facts and circumstances 
changed since the agreement was executed so as to make its enforcement unfair and 
unreasonable). 
91
 See UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1983). 
92
 DOUGLAS E. ABRAMS ET AL., CONTEMPORARY FAMILY LAW 842 (3d ed. 2012); 
Oldham, supra note 81, at 84 (only thirteen states enacted the law without significant 
changes). 
93
 See Bix, supra note 86, at 155.  
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disclosure and conscionability . . . .”94 In fact, when it comes to review of 
unfairness, the UPAA required a higher burden from the challenger than 
conventional contracts require.
95
 This is because the UPAA coupled the 
element of unconscionability with fair disclosure. Namely, under the UPAA, 
an antenuptial agreement would not be enforced if it was unconscionable at 
the time of execution and the affected party did not receive fair disclosure of 
the financial status of the other party.
96
 Conversely, under traditional 
contractual doctrine, each element alone (fair disclosure or 
unconscionability) can serve as a cause for unenforceability.
97
  
The third stage in the evolution generally demonstrates a trend toward a 
regime of difficult entrance and difficult exit, and preference for rules over 
standards, with an emphasis on procedural safeguards over substantive 
ones.  
In 2013, New Jersey amended its version of the UPAA in an effort to 
strengthen the enforceability and predictability of prenuptial agreements and 
protect them from review and possible recession by judges.
98
 Before the 
revision, New Jersey’s law included a second-look provision, authorizing 
courts to examine the fairness of the agreement at the time of enforcement.
99
 
In addition, the law listed unconscionability as a stand-alone cause for 
unenforceability. 
100
 The amendment, however, not only limits the 
examination of unconscionability to the time of execution (and thus 
eliminates the secondlook provision) but also narrows the scope of 
unconscionability, defining four specific factors that determine whether or not 
an agreement is deemed unconscionable.
101
 Under the provision of this 
amendment, the party seeking to set aside the prenuptial must prove that 
she did not receive full disclosure of assets, or did not waive the disclosure, 
or did not have reasonable knowledge about the spouse’s assets, or did not 
consult independent legal counsel (and did not waive, in writing, the 
opportunity to consult one). Put differently, there is not substantive 
unconscionability in New Jersey, only procedural. If the procedural 
requirements were met, and the spouse entered voluntarily into the contract, 
there is no way out. This amendment was motivated by clear animosity 
toward judges’ discretion and by an attempt to strengthen the enforceability 
of antenuptial contracts.
102




 ABRAMS, supra note 92, at 840.  
95
 Bix, supra note 86, at 156.  
96 
UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT § 6(A)(2) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1983). 
97
 Bix, supra note 86, at 155–56.  
98
 N.J. S. JUDICIARY COMM. STATEMENT, S.B. 2151, 215th Sess. (2012) (“This bill would 
strengthen the enforceability of premarital and pre-civil union agreements.”).  
99
 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 37:2–38(b) (West Supp. 2015) (deleted by amendment, P.L.2013, 
c. 72).  
100
 See N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 37:2–38(b)–(c).  
101
 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 37:2–38(c)–(d) (“An agreement shall not be deemed 
unconscionable unless the circumstances set out in subsection c. of this section are 
applicable.”).  
102
 See Hearing on S2151 Before the S. Judiciary Comm., 2012 Leg., 215th Sess. 1 
(N.J. 2012) (statement of S. Nicholas Scutari, Speaker, S. Judiciary Comm.).   
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New Jersey, challenging a prenuptial agreement is more difficult than 
attacking a conventional contract.  
Finally, the most noteworthy legal development in the field is the 2012 
promulgation of the UPMAA.
103
 In drafting the UPMAA three decades after 
the UPAA, the Uniform Law Commission responded to criticism of the UPAA 
as well as to the wide variation among states in its implementation.
104
 
Fortunately, it did not take the extreme approach adopted by New Jersey; 
rather, as described by two committee members, it aimed to strike a balance 
between “informed decision-making and procedural fairness without 
undermining interests in contractual autonomy, predictability, and 
reliance.”105 Indeed, as analyzed below, the UPMAA takes a more balanced 
approach than its predecessor. At the same time, as indicated in that very 
description, the Act’s focus is more on procedure and informed 
decisionmaking and less on substantial unfairness.  
Like its predecessor, the UPMAA specifies that the agreement be in 
writing and signed by both parties.
106
 However, the proposed UPMAA 
changes, in quite significant ways,
107
 the causes of unenforceability that the 
UPAA incorporated: One, the UPMAA strengthens the procedural 
requirements regarding entrance into the contract. Under the UPAA, there 
was no requirement of access to independent legal representation. This 
presented a problem, as sometimes a prospective spouse would introduce 
the agreement a few days before the wedding when the other party did not 
have enough time to consult a lawyer and was under the threat of having to 
cancel the wedding.
108
 The UPMAA sets forth that when one party did not 
have a reasonable opportunity for representation, the contract will not be 
enforced.
109
 To clarify, the UPMAA does not require independent legal 
representation in each agreement but only ensures that the challenger had 
reasonable time and financial means to obtain legal advice.
110
 If a lawyer did 
not represent the party, the UPMAA requires the challenger to sign a clear 






 UNIF. PREMARITAL AND MARITAL AGREEMENTS ACT (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2013).  
104 
See Barbara A. Atwood & Brian H. Bix, A New Uniform Law for Premarital and 
Marital Agreements, 46 FAM. L.Q. 313, 314–15 (2012).  
105 
Id. at 315.  
106
 Id. at 338.  
107
 Id. at 339 (“The standards for enforceability, however, diverge significantly from the 
UPAA.”).  
108 
See Oldham, supra note 81, at 90 (describing cases in which the wealthier party 
presents the prenuptial a short time before the wedding and conditions the marriage on 
signing the prenuptial).  
109
 See UNIF. PREMARITAL AND MARITAL AGREEMENTS ACT § 9(a)(2) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 
2013). Section 9(b) defines what counts as available independent legal counseling. Id. § 
9(b).  
110
 See id. § 9(b)(1)–(2).  
111
 Id. § 9(a)(3) (requiring that the agreement include a “notice of waiver of rights” or 
“an explanation in plain language” of the rights that the challenger waived).   
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Two, as previously stated, under the UPAA, a finding of 
unconscionability required both that the bargain was unreasonable and that 
the challenger did not receive fair disclosure of the other party’s financial 
condition.
112
 The UPMAA uncouples financial disclosure from 
unconscionability, thus compelling adequate disclosure of the partners’ 
financial situations as a stand-alone prerequisite for enforceability.
113
 It also 
contains a separate provision allowing the court to refuse enforcement of the 
whole agreement, or part of it, if it was unconscionable at the time of 
execution— which means that the defense of unconscionability is more 
easily available to challengers of prenuptials.
114
  
Three, the UPMAA, unlike its predecessor, leaves the door open for 
invalidation of antenuptial agreements based on changed circumstances 
during the marriage that result in “substantial hardship.”115 Because the 
drafting committee was divided about the need to have a second-look 
provision,
116
 it decided to add such provision in brackets—meaning that the 
provision is an alternative for states that would like to adopt it, but it is not an 
integral part of the proposed law.
117
  
So far, only two states have adopted the UPMAA and two others have 
introduced a bill but have not finalized the legislative process, and it is 
unlikely that many other states will adopt it. Of the two adopting states, 
Colorado has done so without the bracketed section (the second-look 
provision).
118
 Moreover, Colorado did not adopt the stand-alone 
unconscionability ground. Rather, as soon as prospective spouses follow the 
procedure set forth in the law, the part of the agreement that concerns the 
division of property is deemed enforceable and there is no way to invalidate 
it.
119
 However, Colorado still allows for evaluation of unconscionability at the 
time of enforcement, but only as applied to spousal support and attorney’s 
fees.
120
 In fact, when it comes to distribution of property, substantive 




 See UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT § 6(a)(2) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1983).  
113
 See UNIF. PREMARITAL AND MARITAL AGREEMENTS ACT § 9(a). The Act states that a 
party has “adequate” financial disclosure if: (1) the party receives a description of the 
property income and liability that belong to the other party; (2) waives in writing such 
disclosure; or (3) the party has or should have adequate knowledge of the property income 
and liabilities of the other party. Id. § 9(d).  
114
 See Atwood & Bix, supra note 104, at 342.  
115 
UNIF. PREMARITAL AND MARITAL AGREEMENTS ACT § 9(f)(2).  
116
 Atwood & Bix, supra note 104, at 333.   
117
 UNIF. PREMARITAL AND MARITAL AGREEMENTS ACT § 9(f)(2) (allowing courts to refuse 
enforcement if it “result[s] in substantial hardship for a party because of a material change 
in circumstances arising since the agreement was signed”).  
118
 COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-2-309 (2015).  
119
 Id. (“A premarital agreement or marital agreement or amendment thereto or revocation 
thereof that is otherwise enforceable after applying the provisions of subsections (1) to (4) 
of this section . . . .”).  
120
 Id. § 14-2-309(5).   
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has only been introduced, chose (in its bill) the same system as Colorado 
did.
121
 Conversely, North Dakota has adopted the whole act, including the 
bracketed second-look provision;
122
 and D.C., which has only introduced the 
bill, subscribes to unconscionability only at the time of signing, not at the time 
of enforcement (i.e., D.C. did not adopt the bracketed section).
123
  
What we see here, therefore, is the emergence of a new attitude in the 
enforcement of premarital agreements. Before the emergence of this trend, 
states could have been divided, very roughly, into two approaches: those 
that took a strong pro-enforcement stance (for example, the thirteen states 
that adopted the UPAA without significant changes
124
); and those that 
offered robust protection, both procedural and substantive (for example, 
states that adopted second-look provisions).
125
 What we see in the UPMAA 
itself—and in some of the states that have considered or adopted it—is the 
movement toward both an emphasis on procedural safeguards and a 
reduction in substantive protection.  
In conclusion, states still show considerable variation in their 
enforcement of premarital agreements. However, it seems that the emerging 
trend— demonstrated by five states that recently amended or are about to 
amend their laws and by the general spirit of the UPMAA—is the progression 
toward informed decision making and the abolishment or limiting of 
substantive unconscionability. In Subsection 3, I analyze the consequences 
of this trend. For now, however, to better understand why the law that 
governs premarital agreements adopts neoclassical values, an examination 
of the default rules of marriage dissolution is required.  
 
2. Default Rules  
 
Default rules are modifiable contractual terms that govern the agreement 
in the absence of other agreements by the parties.
126
 The default rules of the 
marriage contract are the state’s laws regarding division of property and 
spousal support upon divorce. In the absence of a marital contract 








 N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 14-03.2-01 to -11 (Supp. 2015).  
123




 See Oldham, supra note 81, at 84 (listing the states that adopted the UPAA with 
slight variations).  
125
 See id. at 103–11 (describing different approaches to substantive review of 
premarital agreements).  
126 
Eric A. Posner, There Are No Penalty Default Rules in Contract Law, 33 FLA. ST. U. 
L. REV. 563, 565 (2006).  
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The study of marital default rules is sometimes separated from the 
exploration of rules pertaining to enforcement of premarital contracts.
128
 
However, the two topics—the contractual doctrine and the default rules—
cannot be separated because some default rules have a significant effect on 
people’s incentive to contract and on the substance of the contract itself.129 
This is especially true in the area of premarital contracts because the parties 
are opting out of the state’s contract (unlike other contracts in which parties 
opt into a contract). This Part examines the default rules of marital 
breakdown.  
Default rules have been changing in a way that favors the wealthier, 
nonprimary caregiver partner.
130
 The rules tend to order division of assets 
equitably in the distribution of property arena, but some rules still disfavor the 
dependent spouse. In the spousal support arena, the developments are 
toward strong restrictions of maintenance.
131
  
By using the term “homemaker,” “primary caregiver,” or “dependent 
spouse,” I refer not only to spouses who do not work outside the home, but 
also, and primarily, to those who work the “second shift” at home or take the 
“mommy track”—those who have invested more in the household, including 
raising the children, and made sacrifices that are likely to result in lost career 
opportunities.
132
 By doing so, I do not mean to ignore the reality that the 
American family has changed significantly, and the typical household does 
not consist only of couples that adopt traditional specialization of labor 





 Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic 
Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 88 n.10 (1989); Scott & Scott, supra note 28, at 
1306.  
128
 The UPMAA, for example, did not discuss the rules of distribution of property and 
alimony or their effect at all. See Atwood & Bix, supra note 104, at 330–31 (reporting that 
the mandate given to the UPMAA committee was limited to premarital and postmarital 
contracts, despite expectation that it would include cohabitation contracts as well). 
Similarly, typically family law casebooks discuss the two topics separately. See, e.g., PETER 
N. SWISHER, ANTHONY MILLER & HELENE S. SHAPO, FAMILY LAW: CASES, MATERIALS, AND 
PROBLEMS 567, 1003 (3d ed. 2012) (chapter 7 discusses “economic consequences of 
divorce” and chapter 11 discusses “marital contracts: premarital and separation 
agreements”).  
129 
See infra note 190 and accompanying text (discussing the effect of default rules on 
the content of the prenuptial agreement); infra notes 263–270 (discussing the effect of 
default rules on financial obligations between cohabitants).  
130 
See, e.g., Scott & Scott, supra note 28, at 1312–18 (suggesting that contemporary 
alimony laws disfavor the spouse who undertakes the main home assignments).  
131
 J. Thomas Oldham, Changes in the Economic Consequences of Divorces, 1958- 
2008, 42 FAM. L.Q. 419, 433 (2008) (“During the past fifty years, equitable distribution has 
become accepted in all common law states. Spousal support is less frequently awarded, 
and when awarded, it is increasingly common for it to be for a fixed term, rather than for an 
indefinite period.”).  
132
 See Oldham, supra note 81, at 124 (“In relationships where the parties raise chil- 
dren, the primary caretaker customarily incurs lifetime career damage.” (footnote omitted)). 
For a discussion and statistics about “homemakers” and gender roles, see infra note 183 
and accompanying text.   
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partners make all the time. However, it is still the reality that, especially in 
households with children, specialization of carework is still prevalent. Some 
less-traditional family structures also embody this characteristic. “As with 
different-sex couples, there are a number of factors that produce and 
maintain power as well as gender in a same-sex marriage.”133 Studies show 
samesex couples “still adopt default patterns of specialized labor within the 
household, even while preferring a narrative of equality within marriage.”134  
The complicated rules of the distribution of property upon breakup—in 
community property states and common law states—come down to whether 
the court divides the spouses’ marital assets equally or equitably.135 Each 
state has its own rules concerning what counts as marital property and 
separate property (and thus not included in the pool that is divided).
136
 The 
nuances of the rules governing division of property upon divorce are 
complicated, uncertain, and hardly known to lay people, and thus may 
prevent people from effectively protecting themselves in advance.
137
  
The range of marital property available for distribution on divorce has 
expanded in the past generation or so, and the trend is toward equitable 
distribution.
138
 At the same time, a few significant rules still disadvantage 
dependent spouses.
139
 For example, in 2009, Alabama enacted a law that 
precludes division of retirement benefits when the marriage lasted less than 
ten years.
140
 In Indiana, unvested retirement benefits are not considered 
marital property,
141





Allison Anna Tait, Divorce Equality, 90 WASH. L. REV. 1245, 1271 (2015).  
134
 Id. at 1268; see also KATHERINE FRANKE, WEDLOCKED: THE PERILS OF MARRIAGE 
EQUALITY 208–24 (2015) (discussing the way that financial obligations of marriage, which 
were tailored according to the needs of heterosexual couples, do not fit the type of 
relationships same-sex couples form, and particularly the way that prenuptial agreements 
that same-sex couples utilize differ from those executed by opposite-sex couples); 
Elizabeth F. Emens, Admin, 103 GEO. L.J. 1409, 1436–37 (2015) (discussing the 
distribution of administrative work within the household among same-sex couples and 
noting that while they tend to split the work more equally than opposite-sex couples, some 
aspects of administrative work are still divided unequally).  
135
 See Carolyn J. Frantz & Hanoch Dagan, Properties of Marriage, 104 COLUM. L. 
REV. 75, 100 (2004). Equal distribution means fifty-fifty division, while equitable distribution 
requires fair division of the assets and retains more discretion to the judges in deciding 
about the division. See Suzanne Reynolds, The Relationship of Property Division and 
Alimony: The Division of Property to Address Need, 56 FORDHAM L. REV. 827, 868–87 
(1988).  
136
 J. Thomas Oldham, Tracing, Commingling, and Transmutation, 23 FAM. L.Q. 219, 
220 (1989).  
137
 See, e.g., Allen M. Parkman, Bringing Consistency to the Financial Arrangements 
at Divorce, 87 KY. L.J. 51, 63 (1998) (arguing that “virtually any outcome is legally 
possible”); John C. Sheldon, Anticipating the American Law Institute’s Principles of the Law 
of Family Dissolution, 14 ME. B.J. 18, 22 (1999) (“Marital property issues tend to be fact-
intensive, and marital distribution statutes tend to be vague and to rely heavily on judicial 
discretion.”).  
138
 See Oldham, supra note 131, at 429–30.  
139
 Tait, supra note 133, at 1272–85.  
140
 ALA. CODE § 30-2-51 (2011).  
141
 See IND. CODE § 31-9-2-98 (1998).  
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valuable part of the marital estate,” this law creates a significant loss to the 
homemaker.
142
 Except for New York,
143
 no other states recognize a license 
or professional degree as marital property,
144
 and while some states have 
some mechanisms for reimbursement of the other spouse’s contribution to 
the relevant education, still others do not recognize the enhanced earning 
that the license provides.
145
 As a result, “the husband . . . is permitted to 
keep most of the assets accumulated during marriage, while the wife who 
has invested in her family and her husband’s career is deprived of a return 
on her marital investment.”146 In Georgia, the Supreme Court recently held 
that property acquired during the marriage is presumed separate property 
unless proven to be marital.
147
 This is contrary to the rules in all other 
states
148
 and can result in unjust outcomes because it is difficult between 
married couples to prove who acquired the property, and when.
149
  
In any event, in many cases distribution of property is less of an issue, 
as most couples do not accumulate significant assets;
150
 the more important 
question involves interest in spousal support (the spouse’s future income).151 
This is especially true when the primary caregiver has lost career 
opportunities resulting from sacrifices that she or he took as a result of a 
bargain with her or his spouse; a job found at this later stage is not likely to 
promise satisfactory financial security.
152
 When it comes to spousal support, 




 Oldham, supra note 131, at 430. One study found that pensions accounted for 
twenty-five percent of the parties’ total wealth on average. Id. at 434.  
143 
See O’Brien v. O’Brien, 489 N.E.2d 712, 713 (N.Y. 1985) (recognizing a medical 
license as marital property).  
144 
Margaret Ryznar, All’s Fair in Love and War: But What About in Divorce? The 
Fairness of Property Division in American and English Big Money Divorce Cases, 86 N.D. 
L. REV. 115, 126 (2010) (“New York is, therefore, in the minority in treating professional 
licenses as marital assets . . . .” (footnote omitted)).  
145 
Id. (“Other jurisdictions may grant the nonprofessional spouse certain relief in limited 
circumstances.”).  
146 
Jana B. Singer, Divorce Reform and Gender Justice, 67 N.C. L. REV. 1103, 1115 
(1989).  
147
 See Newman v. Patton, 692 S.E.2d 322, 323 (Ga. 2010); Dasher v. Dasher, 658 
S.E.2d 571, 572 (Ga. 2008).  
148
 1 Equit. Distrib. of Property, 3d § 5:4 (“In states with no statutory presumption, the 
burden of proof is still ultimately on the spouse who asserts that property owned by one or 
both parties falls within the definition of separate property. Some courts have reached this 
result directly.” (footnote omitted)).  
149
 Oldham, supra note 136, at 220 (“Problems relating to tracing are common in divorce 
since most spouses do not keep property in the same form throughout a marriage.”); see 
Frantz & Dagan, supra note 135, at 101–02 (“The ‘substantial evidence’ to overcome such 
a presumption is rarely forthcoming . . . .” (footnote omitted)).  
150
 See ABRAMS, supra note 92, at 471.  
151
 See Jeffrey Evans Stake, Mandatory Planning for Divorce, 45 VAND. L. REV. 397, 
403–04 (1992). But see Oldham, supra note 131, at 434 (“[T]he adoption of equitable 
distribution may be becoming more significant over time, as more spouses have 
accumulated property of some value during marriage.”).  
152 
See Stake, supra note 151, at 403–04.   
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shorter term and of lesser amount.153 Even before the recent trend of 
alimony reform, courts infrequently granted spousal support.
154
  
The type of spousal support has also radically changed. Whereas 
before, permanent spousal support was the prevailing rule,
155
 most states 
now prefer rehabilitative spousal support: a time-limited order meant to assist 
the nonworking spouse to become self-supporting.
156
 Furthermore, many 
states now restrict permanent alimony to long-term marriages
157
 (e.g., twenty 
years in Massachusetts).
158
 A few states are considering alimony reforms 
that piggyback on Massachusetts’s reform.159 A recent Texas statute allows 
courts to grant spousal support only in marriages longer than ten years, and, 
even then, the duration of alimony for marriages of between ten and twenty 
years cannot exceed seven years.
160 
 
In conclusion, the default rules of marriage, and especially the rules 
governing spousal support, do not adequately compensate the person who 
gave up employment opportunities in order to invest more in the household 
and family.
161
 Now that we have surveyed and analyzed the rules of 
enforceability and the default rules that govern premarital agreements, we 
can move to explore how these rules influence the contracting habits and 
usage of parties, and which values are primarily embedded within this 
contractual instrument.  
 
3. Functional Analysis  
 
In this Subsection, I first ask who the primary users and beneficiaries of 
prenuptial agreements are and to whom they may be detrimental. Then I 
examine whether the neoclassical approach provides sufficient protection to 
those who are potentially vulnerable to harm from prenuptials. Based on the 
design of default rules (property distribution and spousal support), two main 
groups have incentives to execute premarital contracts— i.e., to move away 
from the property and support obligations suggested by the default rules.
162
 




See Judith G. McMullen, Spousal Support in the 21st Century, 29 WIS. J.L. GENDER 
& SOC’Y 1, 6–7 (2014).  
154
 See id. at 6.  
155
 Under an order of permanent spousal support, the payor pays until his death or until the 
payee remarries.  
156 
See Ira Mark Ellman, The Theory of Alimony, 77 CAL. L. REV. 1, 22 (1989).  
157
 See Frantz & Dagan, supra note 135, at 119 (“Those few awards of alimony are almost 
entirely time-limited.”).  
158 
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 208, § 49(b), (f) (2014).  
159
 McMullen, supra note 153, at 8.  
160
 TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 8.051, 8.054 (West Supp. 2015).  
161
 See e.g., Penelope E. Bryan, Reasking the Woman Question at Divorce, 75 CHI.- KENT 
L. REV. 713, 717–18 (2000); Scott & Scott, supra note 28, at 1316 (“Current alimony law 
distorts these incentives by imposing on the homemaker a disproportionate share of the 
financial costs of divorce.”).  
162
 C.f. Ryznar & Stepie˜n-Sporek, supra note 83, at 33. (“Premarital agreements may 
be drafted to either significantly favor or disfavor the more vulnerable spouse upon di  
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who expect to inherit family wealth also execute premarital agreements more 
frequently than ever before)
163
 want to protect themselves from unpredicted 
changes in the default rules.
164 
Likewise, they aspire to guarantee that their 
properties—those they own pre-marriage and/or will receive by inheritance—
will remain theirs and not be transmuted from separate to marital, or be 
subject to a court’s discretion in equitable distribution (as in “kitchen sink” 
states).
165
 This group can also include people who remarry and strive to 
protect their family assets.
166
 The second group comprises the primary 
caregivers.
167
 Because, as shown earlier, the default rules of marriage 
dissolution are construed in a way that does not adequately protect the 
investment of the primary caregivers and compensate for lost career 
opportunities, scholars and practicing attorneys alike agree that primary 







vorce.” (footnote omitted)). These incentives can be theoretical—they assume that the 
parties know the default rules and overcome other cognitive problems that prevent parties 
from executing prenuptial agreements.  
163 
See id. at 61; see also Laura Petrecca, Prenuptial Agreements: Unromantic, But 
Important, USA TODAY (Mar. 11, 2010), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/money/perfi/ba 
sics/2010-03-08-prenups08_cv_n.htm [https://perma.cc/P4KG-BAXD] (quoting American 
Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers president, Marlene Eskind Moses, saying that “[i]t’s not 
just something for the rich and famous any longer. It’s for people that have assets and/or 
income that they want to protect”).  
164
 See Ryznar & Stepie˜n-Sporek, supra note 83, at 61 (“Premarital agreements may 
also be more common among prospective spouses with significant income or age 
disparities.” (footnote omitted)); Heather Mahar, Why Are There So Few Prenuptial 
Agreements? 6 (Harvard Law Sch. John M. Olin Ctr. for Law, Econ. & Bus. Discussion 
Paper Series, Paper No. 436, 2003), 
http://lsr.nellco.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1224&con text=harvard_olin 
[http://perma.cc/Q46D-DHRC] (“[E]ven if a couple finds the present divorce law desirable, 
there is no guarantee that the law at the time of their divorce will not have been modified.”).  
165 
Oldham, supra note 136, at 219 (defining “kitchen sink” states as allowing the “court 
to divide all property owned by either spouse at the time of divorce” (footnote omitted)).  
166
 Sherman, supra note 81, at 373 (“[P]renuptial agreements are more common for 
second marriages than for first marriages.” (footnote omitted)); Ian Smith, The Law and 
Economics of Marriage Contracts, 17 J. ECON. SURVS. 201, 208 (2003).  
167
 See Mahar, supra note 164, at 6.  
168 
See, e.g., Jeff Landers, Deciding To Become A Stay-At-Home Mom? Consider This 
Cautionary Tale, FORBES (May 29, 2014), http://www.forbes.com/sites/jefflanders/2014/ 
05/29/deciding-to-become-a-sahm-stay-at-home-mom-consider-this-cautionary-tale/#1c3 
f57a87fe4 [https://perma.cc/5U9V-5E96] (“[A] prenup or postnup is an absolute legal and 
financial necessity for any woman choosing to give up paid work and all its associated 
benefits, tangible and otherwise, to stay home with the children.”); cf. Stake, supra note 
151, at 402–04, 415 (arguing that current spousal support rules pose a risk to the 
homemaker and proposing that prenuptial agreements could ease this problem). Such 
prenuptial agreement should compensate the partner who serves as the primary caregiver 
for his or her sacrifices in giving up employment opportunity and guarantee that upon 
divorce the caregiver will maintain a similar lifestyle to the one he or she had prior to 
divorce. Alternatively, the prenuptial should allow the caregiver to catch up on the years of 
lost networking, skills, and employment experience. In practice, such a prenuptial should be 
tailored to the specific couple—depending on the type of lost career opportunities— but 
generally such agreement should provide for a longer alimony period (than the one 
warranted by the default rules) allowing the caregiver to come close to what he or she has 
lost in the years of taking care of children and household. Additionally, such agreement   
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However, the reality is that primary caregivers rarely use prenuptials to 
protect their interests. Indeed, “somewhat paradoxically, it is wives in 
traditional marriages that empirically are less likely to write a marital contract 
even though they apparently have the most to gain from doing so.”169 In 
accordance, ample evidence indicates that the majority of prenuptial 
agreements are initiated by the economically privileged partners in order to 
shield their assets.
170
 Concerning the substance of the agreement, Oldham 
explains that “[s]ome limit the rights of the less wealthy spouse but still 
provide significant financial recovery to that spouse if the marriage ends in 
divorce. But many severely restrict or attempt to completely eliminate all 
financial claims upon divorce.”171  
A few reasons explain why primary caregivers execute prenuptials 
infrequently— despite their strong interest.
172
 Some reasons for failure to 
execute prenuptials agreements are applicable to both parties. For instance, 
some partners may not be aware of the benefit of executing a prenuptial 
agreement.
173
 Most people are ignorant of the complex rules surrounding the 
financial consequences of marriage dissolution;
174
 they assume that the 
default rules will be more or less similar to their expectations.
175
 Relatedly, 
many parties are too optimistic regarding the likelihood of divorce and thus 
devaluate the potential benefit of a prenuptial agreement.
176
 Further, drafting 
can be costly.
177
 Parties can use boilerplates, but then they risk signing an 
agreement that does not suit their needs.
178
 And some parties think that 
suggesting a prenuptial signals that they are untrustworthy, or that they are  
 
 
can include a mechanism for compensation for enhanced earning capacity incurred by the 
spouse who did not give up career development (for example, stipulating that a 
professional license is a marital property).  
169
 Smith, supra note 166, at 212.  
170
 See id. at 208; see also MARY ANN GLENDON, THE TRANSFORMATION OF FAMILY 
LAW: STATE, LAW, AND FAMILY IN THE UNITED STATES AND WESTERN EUROPE 139 (1989) 
(noting that prenuptial agreements “are nearly always used to insulate the property of the 
economically stronger spouse, who in most cases will have the better bargaining 
position.”). Indeed, as J. Thomas Oldham notes, “Although in rare instances a premarital 
agreement provides additional rights to the spouse with fewer assets, the ‘stereotypic’ 
voluntary execution case involves this scenario: the wealthier party decides he or she 
wants a premarital agreement to limit the other party’s financial claims if the parties 
divorce.” Oldham, supra note 81, at 89 (footnotes omitted).  
171
 Oldham, supra note 81, at 103 (footnotes omitted).  
172
 See also Elizabeth F. Emens, Regulatory Fictions: On Marriage and 
Countermarriage, 99 CAL. L. REV. 235, 264—65 (2011) (suggesting four reasons for why 
the state could reasonably refuse to enforce contracts between romantic partners).  
173
 Mahar, supra note 164, at 9.  
174
 Id. at 7–8.  
175
 Lynn A. Baker & Robert E. Emery, When Every Relationship Is Above Average: 
Perceptions and Expectations of Divorce at the Time of Marriage, 17 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 
439, 441 (1993).  
176
 See, e.g., Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Limits of Cognition and the Limits of 
Contract, 47 STAN. L. REV. 211, 254 (1995); Mahar, supra note 164, at 9.  
177
 Eric Rasmusen & Jeffrey Evans Stake, Lifting the Veil of Ignorance: Personalizing 
the Marriage Contract, 73 IND. L.J. 453, 461 (1998).  
178 
See Ryznar & Stepie˜n-Sporek, supra note 83, at 41 (analyzing the advantages and 
disadvantages of using boilerplates in prenuptial agreements).   
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opportunistic; others are uncomfortable raising these issues for other 
reasons.
179
 While both partners may share ignorance and cognitive bias, the 
result will typically be harsher for the economically disadvantaged partner.  
Some other reasons explain why the primary caregiver is more inclined 
not to enter into prenuptial agreements or will enter into a less favorable one. 
Generally, even if partners execute an agreement, their over-optimism about 
the longevity of their marriage may cause them to invest less in negotiating 
ideal terms.
180
 Indeed, “Persons contemplating marriage are unlikely to view 
the prospective partner objectively and may not measure the potential costs 
and benefits of the marital state accurately.”181 Importantly, due to these 
cognitive biases, couples may fail to insert provisions that will excuse them 
from performance in cases of changed circumstances (for example, not 
anticipating that they may lose employability).
182
  
But not only are primary caregivers less likely to enter into protective 
agreements, they are also more prone to be harmed by doing so. Despite 
the potential of prenuptial agreements to protect the economically vulnerable 
party, they could disadvantage that party in a few instances. This is true for 
few reasons. One stems from the gender of the typical primary caregiver: 
Primary homemakers, even if they also work outside the home, are still 
predominantly women.
183
 The division of gender specialization also holds 
true for wealthier couples—those who are most likely to use prenuptial 
agreements.
184
 Meta-analyses of studies of women as negotiators 
persistently show that women have different negotiating styles than men, 
which may lead to detrimental results.
185
 Women are generally “less likely 




 See Rasmusen & Stake, supra note 177, at 461.   
180 
Smith, supra note 166, at 214.  
181
 Elizabeth S. Scott, Rational Decisionmaking About Marriage and Divorce, 76 VA. L. 
REV. 9, 63 (1990).  
182
 Id. at 82–83.  
183
 See U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, WOMEN IN THE LABOR FORCE: A DATABOOK 
2 (2013), http://www.bls.gov/cps/wlf-databook-2012.pdf [perma.cc/AR25- 3HBX] (noting 
that in 2011, 64.2% of mothers with children under six years did not work outside the home, 
compared with 76.5% of mothers with children six to seventeen years of age, and 27% of 
employed women usually worked part-time, while only 11% of men did); Ira Mark Ellman, 
Divorce Rates, Marriage Rates, and the Problematic Persistence of Traditional Marital 
Roles, 34 FAM. L.Q. 1, 20–26 (2000) (“[S]acrifices in earnings potential for the sake of the 
marriage will be common even among wives who work full-time during marriage, and also 
make it more likely that husbands will outearn their wives.”); Cynthia Lee Starnes, Lovers, 
Parents, and Partners: Disentangling Spousal and Co-Parenting Commitments, 54 ARIZ. L. 
REV. 197, 206–07 (2012) (“The primary family responsibilities that lead married mothers to 
limit paid employment go far in explaining the motherhood penalty. Minimized investments 
in the job market often mean less pay, less advancement, and, over time, reduced earning 
potential as opportunities disappear.” (footnote omitted)).  
184 
Katharine K. Baker, The Stories of Marriage, 12 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 1, 25 (2010) 
(“[T]he more wealth a married couple has, the more profound their gender specialization 
tends to be.” (footnote omitted)).  
185
 Deborah M. Kolb, Negotiating in the Shadows of Organizations: Gender, 
Negotiation, and Change, 28 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 241, 242–43 (2013); Amy L. 
Wax, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Market: Is There a Future for Egalitarian Marriage?,   
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ask, less likely to initiate negotiations, less positively disposed toward 
negotiation, less confident, and more likely to set lower goals.”186 The 
differences in bargaining styles are especially great when ambiguous terms 
such as “equitable distribution” are involved.187 Furthermore, women 
generally have more to lose from not getting married than men do because 
their marriage prospects decline with age, while men’s age range for getting 
married is longer.
188
 For this reason, some women may feel more willing to 
enter into a marriage that includes a bad bargain than to begin searching 
again for a partner.
189
  
An additional important reason that prenuptials can pose greater harm to 
the primary caregiver is that default rules create an endowment that limits 
the effectiveness of the bargain. As Janet Halley points out, “‘[B]argaining in 
the shadow of the law’—or at least, of what the spouses think the law to be—
does not emerge suddenly in divorce negotiations but rather permeates 
marriage . . . .”190 Because parties bargain in the shadow of the default rules 
even at the time of executing a prenuptial, it is unlikely that the homemaker 
will get much more than the default rules grant her
191
 since those rules more 
or less set the framework for what each partner expects to get. Of course, 
the bargaining endowments do not exclude the option that the prenuptial will 
grant more than the default, but at the least the default rules stand as a 
general guideline for what the parties can reasonably expect.  
For these reasons, primary caregivers may be better off bargaining 
divorce settlements than prenuptial agreements. While the consensus 
among scholars is that primary caregivers are better off bargaining before 
marriage (compared with during marriage or upon divorce),
192
 this is not 
always the  
 
 
84 VA. L. REV. 509, 579–80 (1998) (citing research that suggests that women are not as 
effective in negotiating as men are).  
186
 Kolb, supra note 185, at 243 (footnotes omitted).  
187
 Tess Wilkinson-Ryan & Deborah Small, Negotiating Divorce: Gender and the 
Behavioral Economics of Divorce Bargaining, 26 LAW & INEQ. 109, 111–12 (2008).  
188 
Wax, supra note 185, at 545–56.  
189
 See id. at 650–52.  
190
 Halley, supra note 30, at 49 (emphasis omitted).  
191
 Cf., M.M. Slaughter, Marital Bargaining: Implications for Legal Policy 29, 40–41, in 
MAKING LAW FOR FAMILIES (Mavis Maclean ed. 2000) (discussing the effect that 
endowments have on the martial bargaining and arguing that social and cultural 
expectations regarding gender roles in marriage pose a limit on women’s bargaining 
powers in premarital agreements).  
192
 Some scholars suggest that women’s bargaining power to execute marital 
agreements is better before marriage compared with negotiating during marriage or upon 
divorce. See Smith, supra note 166, at 214–15; Kaylah Campos Zelig, Putting 
Responsibility Back into Marriage: Making a Case for Mandatory Prenuptials, 64 U. COLO. 
L. REV. 1223, 1229 (1993); see also Stake, supra note 151, at 419 (“Some, but not all, of 
the benefits stemming from premarital contracts assume that negotiation is easier at the 
time of marriage than at the time of divorce. There is reason to believe that early planning 
is much less stressful.”). During marriage, the argument goes, women have more to lose 
(for example, due to the decline in their earning capacity), which may incentivize them to 
stay in the marriage even in return for a bad bargain. Similarly, upon divorce, women 
generally face harsher financial consequences. See Pamela Laufer- Ukeles, 
Reconstructing Fault: The Case for Spousal Torts, 79 U. CIN. L. REV. 207, 233   
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case. Taking into consideration the trend toward strict enforcement of 
premarital agreements, the dependent spouse could, in some cases, be 
better off negotiating ex-post (at the time of divorce) when the default rules of 
spousal support are based on need.
193
 Because the alimony award is often 
based on need, in the case of changed circumstances or when the couple 
was married for a long time,
194
 a homemaker will likely fare better under the 
default rules than under strict enforcement of a harsh prenuptial. With the 
decline of second- look provisions—which would invalidate prenuptials in 
cases of changed circumstances—people in long-term marriages with 
children, or people who suffered unforeseeable events that reduced their 
working capacity, may gain more under the default rules of support that take 
into consideration need, employability, and the marriage’s longevity.195 
Executing a prenuptial has other advantages—like saving transactional costs 
of future litigation, which can be prohibitively expensive, and reducing the 
accompanying acrimony
196
—but, even so, between the options of a difficult 
divorce or being divorced without financial means, the former seems better.  
Taken together, all these factors—over-optimism about staying married, 
cognitive bias in predicting change of circumstances, different perspectives 
on bargaining, more urgency to marry at a younger age, and limitation on the 
substance of the bargain as a result of the default—can lead some 






(2010) (“[I]t is undisputed that women are worse off after divorce than men.” (footnote 
omitted)); Matthew McKeever & Nicholas H. Wolfinger, Reexamining the Economic Costs 
of Marital Disruption for Women, 82 SOC. SCI. Q. 202, 215 (2001); Scott & Scott, supra note 
28, at 1317 n.214 (“In a traditional marriage, the homemaker wife, evaluating her reduced 
future earning capacity and declining prospects for remarriage, is disadvantaged in 
bargaining during the marriage.”). In addition, finding out before getting married that the 
prospective husband is opportunistic can be a warning signal to the future bride; the 
prospective bride can then choose a different partner while she still has good prospects for 
getting married. Cf. Wax, supra note 185, at 651 (arguing that forcing parties to negotiate 
before marriage makes for more efficient agreements because it may eliminate “the 
possibility of opportunistic renegotiation or defection” and “expensive, inefficient self 
protective behavior and underinvestment,” which may lead to women capturing greater 
bargaining power, predictability, stability, and permanence). While this is a valid 
perspective, it still does not render the deficits of bargaining before marriage—which are 
suggested by this Article—less significant.  
193 
Cf. Scott & Scott, supra note 28, at 1307 n.191 (“Women who are less assertive 
negotiators than men will be more likely to hold onto the default baseline than to bargain 
aggressively in environments where legal claims are uncertain.”).  
194 
See Tait, supra note 133, at 1283 (“To begin, the low- or non-earner must often 
pass a needs test in order to qualify for alimony.”).  
195
 Cf. Scott, supra note 181, at 73–74 (“Also troublesome is that events not 
anticipated at the time of marriage may result in unfairness if precommitments are 
enforced.” (footnote omitted)).  
196 
Stake, supra note 151, at 418 (“Setting aside beneficial effects on behavioral 
incentives during the marriage and enhanced marital harmony, the reduced costs at 
breakup alone might justify mandating premarital agreements.”).  
197
 See Orit Gan, Contractual Duress and Relations of Power, 36 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 
171 (2013) (arguing that the duress doctrine fails to recognize power imbalance and   
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Against this backdrop, we can move now to examine the type of protection 
that the neoclassical trend—and its focus on procedural safeguards— 
provides. What the UPMAA approach—and to a larger extent the approach 
of New Jersey and the few states that adopted or introduced the UPMAA— 
suggests is a trade-off: stronger procedural requirements that aim to inform 
the weaker party of her potential loss, in exchange for stronger predictability 
of enforceability of these agreements, i.e., less power to judges to set these 
agreements aside based on unfairness or changed circumstances. What the 
UPMAA and the aforementioned states do not take into consideration are the 
well-known deficiencies of mandated disclosure and procedural safeguards.  
The rules governing prenuptial agreements assume that more 
information will direct people to reach better decisions.
198
 But this proposition 
ignores the real problem: even if people get full information, they can still 
make bad choices. As stated recently by Omri Ben-Shahar and Carl E. 
Schneider, “A great and growing literature in social psychology and 
behavioral economics documents the ways people distort information and 
ignore and misuse it in making decisions. That literature teaches that you do 
not solve the problem of bad decisions by giving people information.”199  
Without mandatory legal advice,
200
 the procedural requirement of signing 
a waiver does not remedy the cognitive bias inherent in the situation: it does 
not assist with the parties’ over-optimism vis-`a-vis divorce that may cause 
them to bargain less nor does it assist with the inability to predict 
unanticipated contingencies in their lives.
201
 Even legal advice does not 
guarantee that the prospective spouse will bargain wisely. As explained by 




showing how such a narrow approach disfavors the weaker party in prenuptial enforcement 
proceedings).  
198
 Cf. Atwood & Bix, supra note 104, at 332 (2012) (“[R]equiring that one have a basic 
understanding of what he or she is waiving seemed appropriate as a matter of fundamental 
fairness.”).  
199 
Omri Ben-Shahar & Carl E. Schneider, The Failure of Mandated Disclosure, 159 U. 
PA. L. REV. 647, 720 (2011).  
200 
As a reminder, the UPMAA requires access to independent legal counsel if the 
other party was represented, but does not mandate representation—it only assures 
accessibility. UNIF. PREMARITAL AND MARITAL AGREEMENTS ACT § 9(b) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 
2013). Alternatively, if the party who forfeits rights was not represented, the agreement 
must include a “notice of waiver of rights” or “an explanation in plain language” of the rights 
being waived. Id. § 9(a). In addition, there is a requirement of fair disclosure of assets and 
liabilities, unless the other party already has knowledge or a reasonable basis for 
knowledge of the information. Id. § 9(d)(3). No doubt these rules help in assuring that 
partners have more knowledge before signing a prenuptial. The rules will be effective in 
preventing the somewhat common practice of a partner suggesting a prenuptial agreement 
just a short time prior to the wedding.  
201
 With regard to the contingency problem, Elizabeth Scott suggests that it may be 
mitigated by using standard forms and by background rules that define the conditions of 
modification and excuse. Scott, supra note 181, at 85–90. The problem with Scott’s sug- 
gestion is simply that these background rules are disappearing (the diminishing of second- 
look provisions). The only such background rule adopted by the UPMAA concerns 
disregarding a waiver of spousal support that causes a party to be eligible for public 
assistance. UNIF. PREMARITAL AND MARITAL AGREEMENTS ACT § 9(e).   
\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLG\39-2\HLG201.txt     unknown         Seq: 1   6-MAY-16         10:38 
 
132   Harvard Journal of Law & Gender   [Vol. 39 
 
 
for many would seem a breach of trust and therefore might lead to the 
(future) spouse accepting terms that he or she otherwise would not have 
accepted.” 202 Indeed, as stated by an appellate court in New Zealand, legal 
advice does “not protect one who ignores or disregards the advice.”203 Thus, 
“even the best legal advice cannot be more than a safeguard, but never the 
safeguard.”204  
Further, the procedural requirements of antenuptial formation do not 
address the limitations of bargaining in the shadow of the default rules. They 
also do not sufficiently mitigate the disadvantage in many women’s 
negotiating styles under the present adversarial system, and do not give any 
weight to the general disadvantage that women face bargaining in the 
shadow of the marriage market.  
Not only do the procedural safeguards fail to offer sufficient protection to 
the primary caregiver, but they are also likely to result in a diminishing review 
of substantive unconscionability. Traditionally, in conventional contracts law, 
courts have found unconscionability only when both procedural and 
substantive unconscionability exist.
205
 However, often when full disclosure is 
made, “an empty but formally correct disclosure can keep the contract from 
being unconscionable, however problematic its terms.”206 This is already the 
case in New Jersey and in Colorado (with regard to division of property): 
when the parties meet the procedural criteria, they cannot raise any further 
arguments concerning the fairness of the deal. It is likely that even in states 
that would adopt a stand-alone unconscionability standard, as suggested by 
the UPMAA, courts will be less willing to invalidate the agreement once the 
parties have followed the procedural rules of executing a prenuptial.  
The law and function of prenuptial agreements thus fit squarely within 
the neoclassical approach. The law focuses on imposing requirements for 
formation of contracts that aim to assure the parties’ consent to the 
agreement. But the neoclassical approach disregards the reality of the 
marriage market, the inequality of the bargainers, the design of default rules, 
and unfair results.
207
 It also strengthens predictability while diminishing 




 Jens M. Sherpe, Marital Agreements and Private Autonomy in Comparative 
Perspective, in MARITAL AGREEMENTS AND PRIVATE AUTONOMY IN COMPARATIVE 
PERSPECTIVE 443, 495 (Jens M. Sherpe ed., 2012).  
203
 See Coxhead v. Coxhead (1993) 2 NZLR 397, 404 (N.Z.).  
204
 Scherpe, supra note 202, at 495.  
205
 Lonegrass, supra note 73, at 12.  
206
 Ben-Shahar & Schneider, supra note 199, at 739.  
207
 See Blake D. Morant, The Salience of Power in the Regulation of Bargains: 
Procedural Unconscionability and the Importance of Context, 2006 MICH. ST. L. REV. 925, 
947–48 (2006) (“Conspicuously absent from the [unconscionability] doctrine’s elements is 
consideration of subjective factors related to power, class, gender, or race . . . . The 
doctrine does not account for the parties’ pre-bargain attitudes and behavior that may 
influence the terms of their agreement.” (footnotes omitted)).  
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cretion and making the excuse of obligation more difficult—all characteristics 
of neoclassical contract theory.
208
  
In conclusion, the neoclassical trend adopted to alleviate bargaining 
imbalance in the premarital-agreements context reflects another example of 
the position, described by Duncan Kennedy as “center-left,” that focuses on 
“eliminating inequality of bargaining power” but “has nothing to do with 
eliminating factual inequalities.”209 As long as the procedural requirements 
are met, those mechanisms’ primary purpose is to assure the enforceability 
of the contract and reduce the power of courts to invalidate unfair 
bargains.
210
 Parties can end up with a severely unfair bargain and the court 
would not set aside the agreement because the formal requirements were 
met. The spirit of the legal change is to make the weaker party aware of her 
losses and then make the agreement enforceable anyway.  
 
C. Cohabitation Contracts  
 
While cohabitation contracts and premarital agreements are treated as 
distinct topics—both in family law casebooks, as evidenced by their 
organization into different sections,
211
 and in legislative work, as evidenced 
by the work of the UPMAA committee
212
—the two have clear connections. 
One main correlation is in the way that the rules that govern enforcement of 
both types of contracts potentially influence people’s choices regarding their 
relationship status and financial arrangements. That is, if cohabitation does 
not warrant financial obligations between the partners without entering into 







 Cf. Melvin A. Eisenberg, Why There Is No Law of Relational Contracts, 94 NW. U. 
L. REV. 805, 808 (2000) (“[T]he rules of classical contract law were implicitly based on the 
assumptions that actors are fully knowledgeable . . . . This model accounts in part for such 
rules as the duty to read, whose operational significance was that actors were conclusively 
assumed to have read and understood everything that they signed.”); Feinman, supra note 
17, at 1286–87 (“When courts mechanically applied these abstract, formal doctrines, they 
protected the individual’s right to assume contractual obligation or to avoid it at the same 
time as they provided a predictable basis for commercial transactions.”).  
209
 Duncan Kennedy, Distributive and Paternalist Motives in Contract and Tort Law, 
with Special Reference to Compulsory Terms and Unequal Bargaining Power, 41 MD. L. 
REV. 563, 621, 624 (1982).  
210 
See Lonegrass, supra note 73, at 54 (“The conventional approach to 
unconscionability is decidedly formalist. Requiring strong evidence of procedural 
unconscionability maintains the ideal of freedom of contract by permitting judges to 
interfere only in contracts that exhibit clear deficiencies in consent.” (footnote omitted)).  
211 
See, e.g., SWISHER, supra note 128, at 173, 1003 (dealing with “disputes between 
unmarried cohabitants” in chapter 2 and discussing marital contracts in chapter 11).  
212 
Atwood & Bix, supra note 104, at 331 (reporting that the UPMAA committee wanted 
to draft a law that addresses cohabitation contracts but was ultimately limited to premarital 
and marital agreements).   
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would be better off cohabiting than marrying.
213
 If, on the other hand, 
cohabitation without express contract imposes financial obligations, some 
people may be better off being married with a prenuptial agreement.
214
 
Therefore, in order to form a more comprehensive understanding of the 
gamut of regulatory choices for arranging relationships, it is necessary to 
examine the rules governing informal relationships.  
 
1. Enforceability  
 
The rules guiding the enforcement of cohabitation contracts vary greatly 
between states.
215
 State rules range from complete non-enforcement, to 
enforcement of written contracts only, to enforcement of implied-in-fact 
contracts and granting of equitable remedies. Since most readers will be 
familiar with this account, this section will describe it only briefly, focusing 
more on the evolution of the law and its consequences.
216
  
As with premarital agreements, until the 1970s courts generally denied 
enforcement of contracts governing the financial obligations between 
unmarried partners, based on public policy doctrine.
217
 In 1976, the famous 
Californian case of Marvin v. Marvin opened the door widely to enforcement 
of such contracts and conceived the concept of palimony.
218
 Not only did the 
Marvin court hold, for the first time, that agreements defining financial 
obligations between cohabiting couples are enforceable as a matter of public 
policy, but the court also stated that “courts may inquire into the conduct of 
the parties to determine whether that conduct demonstrates an implied 
contract or implied agreement of partnership or joint venture, or some other 
tacit understanding between the parties.”219 The Marvin court thus made 
possible an expansive interpretation of contractual obligations between 
partners, including those that derive from alternative theories of liability 









 See e.g., Blumenthal v. Brewer, 24 N.E.3d 168, 179 (Ill. App. Ct. 2014) (arguing 
that refusing to enforce obligations between unmarried partners may “create[ ] an incentive 
for some to not marry”).  
214 
Of course, the decision of whether to structure one’s intimate life in marriage is 
dependent on many other considerations. Strategically, the choice between marriage and 
cohabitation can be influenced by other factors, such as tax consequences of living in 
marriage, the variety of benefits that are attached to marriage, or cultural preferences.  
215 
Halley, supra note 30, at 20.  
216
 See CYNTHIA GRANT BOWMAN, UNMARRIED COUPLES, LAW, AND PUBLIC POLICY 38–
79 (2010) (detailing an excellent and comprehensive analysis of the legal treatment of 
unmarried partners in the United States).  
217
 See id. at 48.  
218
 Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 106, 122 (Cal. 1976).  
219
 Id. (citations omitted).  
220
 Halley, supra note 30, at 20.   
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Today, all states except for three
221
 enforce written contractual 
obligations between unmarried partners.
222
 In so doing, many states have 
adopted a neoclassical approach for enforceability of such agreements. 
Again, New Jersey provides the best example of such approach. Once 
known (alongside California) for its liberal policy toward enforcement of 
cohabitation contracts, 
223
 New Jersey recently passed an amendment to its 
statute of frauds requiring that cohabitation contracts be in writing and that 
both parties have independent legal advice prior to execution.
224
 Other 
states, either by legislation or court decisions, require that cohabitation 
contracts be subject to the terms of the statute of frauds.
225
 Still others—for 
example, New York—enforce only express agreements.
226
 Furthermore, as 
Cynthia Bowman points out, it is probable that “cohabitants are only slightly 
more likely to obtain ‘palimony’ in California than in New York if the claim 
rests upon an implied contract, and at least the courts in New York are more 
candid about disallowing such claims.”227 While additional states enforce 
implied-in-fact promises and recognize equitable theories for liability, the 
general trend has been toward strengthening procedural requirements for 
entrance into a binding legal contract, such that they are more restrictive 
than those in other conventional contracts.
228
  
Not only are the formal requirements heightened for creating a legally 
binding cohabitation contract, the exit from such an agreement can be 





 See Long v. Marino, 441 S.E.2d 475 (Ga. Ct. App. 1994); Schwegmann v. 
Schwegmann, 441 So. 2d 316 (La. Ct. App. 1983). The third state, Illinois, has for a long 
time been resistant to the enforcement of cohabitation contracts, and that resistance is still 
good law. See Hewitt v. Hewitt, 394 N.E.2d 1204 (Ill. 1979). However, recently an appellate 
court allowed unmarried partners to bring unjust enrichment claims. Blumenthal v. Brewer, 
24 N.E.3d 168 (Ill. App. Ct. 2014). In Mississippi, a valid precedent holds that “cohabitation 
is prohibited as against public policy and that the Legislature has not extended the rights of 
married persons to cohabitants.” Cates v. Swain, No. 2010-CT- 01939-SCT, 2013 WL 
1831783, at *4 (Miss. May 2, 2013). Mississippi thus does not authorize ordering division of 
property between cohabitants when the claim is “based upon a relationship.” Id. However, 
the Supreme Court of Mississippi recently held that a cohabitant may recover the amounts 
she contributed toward the purchase and improvement of one joint residence based on a 
theory of unjust enrichment. Id.  
222
 See Aloni, supra note 1, at 587.  
223
 William H. Danne, Jr., Annotation, “Palimony” Actions for Support Following 
Termination of Nonmarital Relationships, 21 A.L.R. 6th § 10 at 351 (2007).  
224
 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 25:1-5 (West Supp. 2015).  
225
 See, e.g., MINN. STAT. §§ 513.075–.076 (2014); Posik v. Layton, 695 So. 2d 759 
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997) (noting that cohabitation contract must be in writing); Kohler v. 
Flynn, 493 N.W.2d 647, 649 (N.D. 1992) (“If live-in companions intend to share property, 
they should express that intention in writing.”).  
226
 See, e.g., Morone v. Morone, 413 N.E.2d 1154, 1157 (N.Y. 1980).  
227
 BOWMAN, supra note 216, at 51.  
228
 Cf. Gregg Strauss, Why the State Cannot “Abolish Marriage”: A Partial Defense of 
Legal Marriage, 90 IND. L.J. 1261, 1281 (2015) (“Despite their radical potential, the practical 
significance of these new cohabitation doctrines should not be overemphasized. Reported 
cases applying these rules are sparse, the courts have been hesitant to expand the rules, 
and the courts tend to impose substantial evidentiary burdens for successful claims.”).   
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between cohabitants have employed firm rules of enforceability and declined 
to invalidate these contracts based on unfairness.
229
 For instance, the 
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts stated clearly that it evaluates the 
fairness of cohabitation contracts by a different standard than that of 
prenuptial agreements.
230
 Accordingly, the court ruled that a cohabitation 
contract that left a female partner destitute after twenty-five years of 
cohabitation “is enforceable so long as it conforms with the ordinary rules of 
contract law, and a court is no more entitled to inquire into its fairness and 
reasonableness than it is in respect to contracts generally.”231  
Finally, in several states the existence of the option to contract between 
unmarried partners can abrogate the availability of a remedy based on an 
implied-in-law contract.
232
 This is another basic principle deriving from 
classical contract theory: “The binary nature of liability (either a contract had 
been consented to or it had not) precluded the award of alternative 
measures such as reliance or restitution damages.”233 Thus, as a doctrinal 
matter, the option to contract about financial obligations can preclude the use 
of quasi-contract theory.
234
 This is because unjust enrichment, as a doctrine, 
is generally not available as an alternative to contract but, rather, imposes 
liability when parties could not have contracted about the terms.
235 
 
The account presented so far does not purport to indicate that all states 
have adopted such rigid approaches to enforcement of cohabitation 
contracts. Indeed, some states recognize, and in fact apply, a variety of 
theories of recovery to cohabitants upon dissolution. Yet in a recent opinion, 
after a survey of the rules of enforcement in all states, a New Jersey 
Supreme Court justice concluded that “because they are easy to allege yet 
inherently contrary to fundamental legal concepts that have governed our 




 Cf. Elizabeth S. Scott, Marriage, Cohabitation and Collective Responsibility for 
Dependency, 2004 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 225, 255 (“If a couple has an express written 
agreement, enforcement is usually straightforward.”).  
230
 Wilcox v. Trautz, 693 N.E.2d 141, 147 (Mass. 1998) (“An agreement between two 
unmarried parties is not governed by the threshold requirements that apply to an 
antenuptial agreement.” (citation omitted)).  
231
 Id. (citation omitted).  
232
 Cf., e.g., Slocum v. Hammond, 346 N.W.2d 485, 494 (Iowa 1984) (declining to 
grant equitable remedies where no evidence of oral contract between cohabitants existed); 
In re Estate of Alexander, 445 So. 2d 836, 840 (Miss. 1984) (recognizing that deceased 
spouse wanted his partner to have an interest to his property but declining to grant any 
equitable remedies in the absence of a will or a contract); Tarry v. Stewart, 649 N.E.2d 1 
(Ohio Ct. App. 1994) (denying claims for unjust enrichment by cohabitants because the 
claimant had already benefited from the relationship).  
233
 Feinman, supra note 72, at 5; see also Duncan Kennedy, From the Will Theory to 
the Principle of Private Autonomy: Lon Fuller’s “Consideration and Form,” 100 COLUM. L. 
REV. 94, 108 (2000).  
234
 See Emily Sherwin, Love, Money, and Justice: Restitution Between Cohabitants, 
77 U. COLO. L. REV. 711, 724 (2006) (“The second limiting principle holds that restitution is 
not available as an alternative to contract. If the claimant conferred a benefit on the 
defendant in the hope of payment, and could reasonably have negotiated for payment but 
failed to do so, the claimant has no right to restitution.” (footnote omitted)).  
235
 See id.  
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centuries, palimony claims must be viewed with great skepticism and must 
be subjected to harsh and unremitting scrutiny.”236 Indeed, this determination 
supports the argument herein that cohabitant contracts also tend toward the 
neoclassical. The prevailing trend is to condition their enforcement on 
formalities and reduce the availability of alternative theories of liability; once 
the procedural requirements are fulfilled, it is difficult to excuse the 
obligations.  
 
2. Default Rules  
 
When it comes to informal relationships, most states have adopted 
default rules that declare that partners do not have financial obligations vis-
`avis one another unless they contract otherwise.
237
 Some states have also 
adopted implicit default rules that domestic services provided during the 
relationship are presumed gratuitous and do not merit compensation.
238
 The 
reason, as articulated by a Connecticut appellate court, is that “the 
household family relationship is presumed to abound in reciprocal acts of 
kindness and good-will, which tend to the mutual comfort and convenience of 
the members of the family, and are gratuitously performed . . . .”239  
In two states, however—Washington and Nevada—courts have adopted 
opposite default rules. In these states, if the couple lived in a “committed 
intimate relationship”—established by such flexible factors as duration of the 
relationship and the pooling of resources—they can apply the community- 
property law by analogy.
240
 Thus, if partners do not want to assume an 




However, those two states are an isolated minority. To see how the 
defaults operate in other states, consider the following case. In M v. F, the 
partners lived together informally for thirteen years and had a child together. 
242
 During the time of the relationship, the male, a founder of a prominent 
advertising company in New York, increased the company’s size from four to 
thirty-five employees, with gross revenue of twenty million dollars.
243
 The 
partners lived together in Soho, Manhattan, in a loft purchased in 1997 with 





 Devaney v. L’Esperance, 949 A.2d 743, 758 (N.J. 2008).  
237
 See Scott, supra note 229, at 229.  
238 
Id. at 257.  
239
 Sullivan v. Delisa, 923 A.2d 760, 769–70 (Conn. App. Ct. 2007) (quoting Cotter v. 
Cotter, 73 A. 903, 903 (1909)).  
240
 Olver v. Fowler, 168 P.3d 348, 354 (Wash. 2007); Strauss, supra note 228, at n. 
112 (“Nevada’s case law begins with implied-in-fact contract theory, Hay v. Hay, 678 P.2d 
672, 674-75 (Nev. 1984), but recent cases deemphasize the implied exchange in favor of 
an inquiry into whether the couple ‘impliedly agreed to hold their property as though they 
were married.’ W. States Constr., 840 P.2d at 1224.”).  
241
 Aloni, supra note 1, at 590.  
242
 M v. F, No. 350065/09, 2010 WL 1379034, at *1 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Mar. 23, 2010).  
243
 Id.  
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plaint, she was raising their mutual daughter and supporting his two children 
from previous relationships, maintained the household, and was active in 
providing ideas for his work (she had also worked in the field). Her partner, 
according to the complaint, kept promising her “what’s mine is yours” and 
made other promises to keep supporting her and sharing their properties.
244
 
Upon the couple’s breakup, the man refused to give her any rights to his 
multiple properties, including their residence, and the woman sued for her 
share based on a theory of constructive trust
.245 
While the New York 
Supreme Court was “not entirely unsympathetic to the circumstances 
described by the Mother,” it rejected her claim, stating that it is “long-
standing law and policy in New York that unmarried partners are not entitled 
to the same property and financial rights upon termination of the relationship 
as married people.”246  
 
3. Functional Analysis  
 
In the context of cohabitation contracts, the neoclassical approach to 
family contracts is doing the opposite work than it does in premarital 
contracts: it protects one’s freedom from contract.247 The different approach 
stems from the fact that marital contracts already warrant obligations 
between the partners—thus, by executing a prenuptial agreement, parties 
opt out from the marital contract and protect their freedom to enter into a 
contract different than the one dictated by the state. Conversely, the rules 
concerning cohabitation contracts protect parties from obligations to the 
other party if they have not specifically delimited those obligations (opt-in 
approach). This goal is achieved by the symbiosis of default rules and rules 
of formation, which places the burden to opt in on the party who wants to 
secure some financial obligations from the other partner (as opposed to 
burdening the other party, who may want to avoid any distribution). The 
design of these rules, I assert below, disfavor the weaker, less-informed 
partner.  
The rules of formation and default rules in this area are grounded in solid 
rationales: mainly, that proving oral and implied promises between intimate 
partners is costly and invasive, and courts encounter unique difficulty in 
discerning the partners’ intentions.248 The doctrine also protects partners 




 Id. at *1–2.  
245
 Id. at *2  
246
 Id. at *4 (citation omitted).  
247
 See Kennedy, supra note 209, at 568–70 (deconstructing the principle of freedom 
of contracts into rules that permit freedom to bind oneself and rules that support the 
freedom not to bind oneself without a will).  
248
 See BOWMAN, supra note 216, at 51; Brian H. Bix, Private Ordering and Family 
Law, 23 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM. LAW.  
249
, 272–73 (2010); Scott, supra note 229, at 256–57 (“[T]he ability of third parties (for 
example, courts) to discern accurately the parties’ expectations on the basis of their 
conduct in this context is limited.”).  
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 Thus, to protect parties from the ascription of obligations that they 
have not voluntarily assumed, and to channel parties to express their 
commitments clearly, the rules warrant that, unless otherwise contracted, the 
parties do not have financial obligations vis-`a-vis one another.  
But despite the fact that these rules are grounded in solid justifications, 
the doctrine in effect strongly favors the most sophisticated party, whose 
decision not to get married may be motivated by his desire to protect his 
wealth.
250
 The set of rules concerning obligations among unmarried couples 
leaves it to the weaker party to protect herself or himself by contracting to 
create commitment.
251
 The problem is, however, that unmarried partners 
often do not think in contractual terms and do not have sufficient 
understanding of the rules surrounding legal obligations between unmarried 
partners.
252
 Sometimes, as well, the partners do not know how their 
relationship will develop and thus fail to protect themselves.
253
 Additionally, 
signing a cohabitation contract can be costly and thus unavailable to the 
economically weaker party.
254
 The weaker party can attempt to use 
boilerplates that are readily available, but without knowledge of the rules, she 
may be hesitant to sign one, or to sign what she may fear to be an unfair 
bargain. Further, some people are unaware of the required formalities
255
 or 




Reliance on contractual principles, and in particular on opt-in 
requirements to create obligations, threatens to adversely affect the primary 
caregiver in another way.
257




 See Marsha Garrison, Is Consent Necessary? An Evaluation of the Emerging Law 
of Cohabitant Obligation, 52 UCLA L. REV. 815, 857 (2005) (“Under conscriptive rules, 
individuals are no longer free to choose when, how, and whether to marry; instead, the 
state—after the fact—decides for them.”); Lifshitz, supra note 5, at 1576 (arguing that the 
choice not to marry may reflect an opposition to bear financial obligations and, “precisely 
from the liberal approach, which stresses individuals’ intentions, it is appropriate to respect 
their decision not to marry, and not impose upon them quasi-marital obligations” (footnote 
omitted)).  
250
 Am. Law Inst., Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution: Analysis and 
Recommendations, 8 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 1, 30 (2001) (“Failure to marry may . . . 
reflect strong social or economic inequality between the partners, which allows the stronger 
partner to resist the weaker partner’s preference for marriage.”).  
251
 See BOWMAN, supra note 216, at 228.   
252 
Ellman, supra note 31, at 1367, 1369; Lifshitz, supra note 5, at 1577–78 (“Typical  
couples, however, are rarely consciously thinking of the legal aspects of their relationship.”) 
(footnote omitted).  
253
 BOWMAN, supra note 216, at 52.  
254
 Cf. Eskridge, supra note 1, at 1976–77 (“[F]ew Americans have the foresight or  the 
resources to contract for all the possibilities that can arise in family relationships . . . .”).  
255
 See Carol S. Bruch, Property Rights of De Facto Spouses Including Thoughts on 
the Value of Homemakers’ Services, 10 FAM. L.Q. 101, 135 (1976); Eskridge, supra note 1, 
at 1979.   
256
 BOWMAN, supra note 216, at 231–32.   
257
 Cf. Clare Dalton, An Essay in the Deconstruction of Contract Doctrine, 94 YALE 
L.J. 997, 1107 (1985) (“[C]ourts can justify the failure to enforce cohabitation arrangements 
as mere nonintervention, overlooking the fact that the superior position in which  
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reluctance to bargain, their less attractive options in the employment market, 
and their bigger loss from leaving the relationship.
258
 It does not address the 
still-common situation in which female cohabitants devote time to caregiving, 
contribute to household expenses, and so forth.
259
 Indeed, “the cohabitants’ 
unequal bargaining power leads to unjust results under contract theory.”260  
The design of default rules—no automatic obligations without contractual 
agreement—favors the party who would like to avoid commitment. As 
explained by Elizabeth Scott, under current default rules, the economically 
stronger party can hide his intentions regarding the financial commitment 
between the partners.
261
 At the same time, the financially stronger party, 
though promising that he will support his partner at the end of the 
relationship, can make financial arrangements that advance his position 
upon breakup (such as putting titles solely under his name). “In this way, he 
reaps substantial benefits from the relationship, and then is protected by the 
implicit default rule against financial sharing between cohabiting partners.”262  
Setting the default rules this way also ratifies possible informational 
asymmetry between the more sophisticated party and the less informed 
one.
263
 Ian Ayres and Robert Gertner argue that in the context of informed 
and less informed parties, the efficient way to design default rules is against 
the informed party. In this way, they argue, a “penalty default” incentivizes 
the informed party, who is interested in altering the default, to reveal 
information about his intentions and the legal situation surrounding the 
topic.
264
 If, however, the default rules are favorable to the informed party, he 
will not have a reason to alter the default and to reveal his intentions. The 
likely result is that the less informed party will not know about the rule and 
the disadvantage it creates. Such design, they argue, encourages 
opportunistic behavior by the more informed party.
265
 In the case of 
cohabitation, the informed partner does not have a legal incentive to reveal 
any information  
 
 
nonaction tends to leave the male partner is at least in part a product of the legal system.” 
(footnote omitted)).  
258
 Grace Ganz Blumberg, Cohabitation Without Marriage: A Different Perspective, 28 
UCLA L. REV. 1125, 1163 (1981) (“[T]he essence of a cohabitation or marriage contract 
between heterosexual cohabitants is that the man gives up wealth that would otherwise 
accrue to him in order to insure the woman some semblance of economic dignity. Self-
interest would lead the man to give up as little as possible. The woman has scant leverage 
with which to persuade him otherwise. She lacks economic power. She needs a stable 
relationship more than he does . . . .” (footnote omitted)).  
259
 See BOWMAN, supra note 216, at 227.  
260
 Blumberg, supra note 258, at 1163.  
261
 Scott, supra note 229, at 260.  
262
 Id.  
263
 Cf. Elizabeth S. Scott, Domestic Partnerships, Implied Contracts, and Law Reform, 
in RECONCEIVING THE FAMILY: CRITIQUE ON THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE’S PRINCIPLES OF 
THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION 331, 345 (Robin Fretwell Wilson ed., 2006) (discussing 
unequal information or expectation between unmarried partners).  
264
 Ayres & Gertner, supra note 127, at 91.  
265
 Id. at 96–100.
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about his intentions regarding financial obligations. He can use the ignorance 
of the weaker party (in terms of not knowing about the penalty) to avoid 
obligations.
266
 If the rule were the opposite, the informed party would be 
encouraged either to stay with the default (and thus be committed to 
undertaking financial obligations) or to reveal his intention not to share 
commitments— and let the less informed party decide whether to remain in 
such relationship or not.
267
 However, because most states have adopted 
rules that put the burden to contract on the less informed partner, the 
stronger partner has no incentive to reveal any information and to negotiate 
about the terms.  
The defaults play another role in disadvantaging the weaker party, by 
creating a shadow of endowments that limit that party’s possible 
achievement. As explained by Russell Korobkin, “Contracting parties may 
view the default term . . . as a status quo endowment” and not alter the 
defaults because “their preference for maintaining the status quo relative to 
alternative states swamps their preference for the alternative contract term 
relative to the default term.”268 In particular, in the case of cohabitation 
contracts, defaults reflect the assumption that carework and housework are 
less valuable commodities than other, outside-of-the-home work. This is 
because the defaults presume that housework is given gratuitously and 
because some women tend to undermine their contribution.
269
 Thus, the 
default rules also confer a bargaining disadvantage on the homemaker.
270
  
Based on the function of the rules, it is safe to conclude that contractual 
obligations between unmarried partners also adopt a neoclassical approach. 
Construed with rigid rules of formation, diminishing the availability of other 
bases of liability, and defaults that disadvantage the less informed partner, 
these rules mainly support the autonomy of the couples to avoid ascription of 
obligations. The neoclassical approach is helpful to the stronger party and 
fails to protect the economically weaker party.  
The bottom line, per this Article, is that the contractual choice embedded 
in each of these instruments taken separately (prenuptial and cohabitation 
contracts) provides choice that is more helpful to the economically stronger 
partner. The contractual instruments seem better to reflect the values of 
freedom of contract and predictability of enforcement over fairness and 




 See id. at 99.  
267
 Scott, supra note 263, at 345.  
268
 Russell Korobkin, The Status Quo Bias and Contract Default Rules, 83 CORNELL L. 
REV. 608, 675 (1998).  
269
 Scott, supra note 229, at 257; see also Wax, supra note 185, at 583.  
270
 A modest change in the default rules could create significant improvement. For 
example, Elizabeth Scott has suggested that the default rules be construed such that living 
together for five years would raise a rebuttable presumption that the parties intended to 
undertake obligations to one another. This rule would encourage the parties either to opt 
out if they reject the commitment, or to accept the law’s assumption that the parties 
undertook support obligations. See Scott, supra note 263, at 258–65. The main idea is 
simply that a humble change in contractual rules can affect the reality of cohabitants 
without imposing over-inclusive obligations.
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III. CHALLENGING THE MYTHOLOGY OF FAMILY LAW PLURALISM 
 
 
Finding that principles furthered by premarital and cohabitation 
agreements strongly favor contractual autonomy over other values—and 
thus do not reflect the principles of value pluralism—still does not determine 
whether the structure is antipluralistic. This is because a plausible view of 
structural pluralism is that each institution on the menu reflects primarily one 
value while other institutions integrate different values. That is, even if laws 
governing prenuptial and cohabitation agreements reflect neoclassical 
principles, other regulatory regimes on the menu (such as marriage without 
prenuptials) embody other types of values—making the system as a whole 
pluralistic. In this way, arguably, the system itself, with its various options, 
reflects a more diverse set of values. In this Part, I thus examine whether the 
plurality of private ordering options that exist in family law reflect—or 
progress toward reflecting—the principles of value pluralism by offering 
effective choice and incorporating a balance of values.  
To see if the emerging pluralistic structure incorporates the principles of 
value pluralism, we have to examine the system from a panoptic perspective: 
looking at all the contractual instruments and legal institutions together. This 
is necessary to evaluate the effectiveness of choices that the system 
extends because those choices determine partners’ behaviors in selecting 
the institution that better fits them.
271
 Put differently, we also need to learn 
how the different institutions interact with one another such that they channel 
the parties’ choice.272  
Isolating and evaluating the values that comprise the whole system is an 
intricate task. Because the system embodies multiple incommensurable 
values, we cannot put them on a single metric—so there is no quantitative 
measure to segregate and weigh them.
273 
Thus, my methodology is to 
examine the functions that the system serves in the regulation of 
relationships.  
Table 1 indicates the four main institutions and instruments that are 
available for couples to administer their financial obligations vis-`a-vis one 
another, and the values they bear. For each regulatory regime, the table 
identifies how the default rules and the rules that determine formation and 
enforceability of the contract influence the bargain. Importantly, while the 
table’s rubrics reflect the general law in a majority of the states, when it 
comes to enforcement of prenuptial agreements, the rules described in the 




 See Eskridge, supra note 1, at 1977.  
272 
Cf. Aloni, supra note 1, at 606 (arguing that proponents of a menu of options failed 
to explore the way that the different institutions on the menu affect couples’ choice in 
selecting the right framework).  
273
 See Cass R. Sunstein, Incommensurability and Kinds of Valuation: Some 
Applications in Law, in INCOMMENSURABILITY, INCOMPARABILITY, AND PRACTICAL REASON 
234, 238 (Ruth Chang ed., 1997).  
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not of many states that still maintain a more balanced approach or those that 







Arguably, the menu of options—particularly in its contractual alternatives— 
reflects the principles of value pluralism. Facilitating these multiple, flexible 




For a discussion of states that made it easier to contest an alimony waiver, see 
Oldham, supra note 81, at 86–87.  
275
 Courts have traditionally refused to enforce agreements concerning obligations of 
the spouses in an ongoing marriage, invoking the public policy doctrine. See Mary Anne 
Case, Enforcing Bargains in an Ongoing Marriage, 35 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 225, 225 
(2011) (“Courts in this country have generally been closed to those who seek judicial 
enforcement of bargains or judicial resolution of disputes in an ongoing marriage . . . .” 
(footnote omitted)); Kaiponanea T. Matsumura, Public Policing of Intimate Agreements, 25 
YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 159, 192 (2013).  
\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLG\39-2\HLG201.txt     unknown         Seq: 1   6-MAY-16         10:38 
 
144   Harvard Journal of Law & Gender   [Vol. 39 
 
 
gations that suit their relationships, the division of work between them, and 
the particular weight that the specific individuals put on these values. 
Structural pluralism, the argument goes, is compatible with the principles of 
value pluralism because it is grounded in the notion that people appreciate 
divergent kinds of valuations.  
While this view is not completely without merit, it invokes a thin notion of 
autonomy and misreading of value pluralism. Value pluralism has never 
been an invitation to celebrate individual freedom over all other competing 
values.
276
 Facilitation of diverse legal options that embed diverse modes of 
valuations is not tantamount to embodiment of free-market principles. As 
noted by Dagan, “[F]acilitation is rarely exhausted by a hands-off policy and 
a corresponding hospitable attitude to freedom of contract. Rather, 
facilitation requires the law’s active empowerment in providing institutional 
arrangements, including reliable guarantees against opportunistic 
behavior.”277  
The current family law system fails to facilitate a functional structure that 
infuses various and balance of values. Instead, the structure is grounded 
predominantly in notions of negative autonomy: allowing the parties (rather 
than the state) to determine the content of their obligations.
278
 The system 
does not reflect a richer perception of autonomy, one that takes into 
consideration the adaptive preferences of the parties, access to economic 
opportunities and resources, and concerns about the end results of the 
agreement.
279
 Indeed, choice and autonomy are not the same.
280
 Table 1 
demonstrates that the system is mainly devoted to the preservation of 
choice, but focusing on choice grants autonomy disproportionately to the 
economically stronger partner. The type of autonomy that is most 
emphasized in the structure is freedom of contract (including freedom from 
contract).  
The menu also fails to provide effective protection from strategic 
behavior of the kind suggested by Dagan. The multiplicity of options allows 
many opportunities for strategic behavior by the more economically 
privileged partner while failing to provide significant protection to the weaker 
partner. For instance, the partners can live informally and, despite promises 
to the contrary (in the absence of a written contract), the economically 
empowered party can leave the dependent party without any property or 
financial support. If the parties are getting married, the weaker partner is in a 
better position in terms of financial obligations than under all other 
arrangements. However, this protection is gradually eroding as the defaults 





 See William A. Galston, Value Pluralism and Liberal Political Theory, 93 AM. POL. 
SCI. REV. 769, 777 (1999).  
277 
Dagan, supra note 22, at 1429.  
278 
MICHAEL J. TREBILOCK, THE LIMITS OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACTS 9 (1993) (discussing 
theories that “emphasize a more expansive conception of individual liberty that has both 
negative and positive dimensions”).  
279 
See id. at 243.  
280 
Singer, supra note 26, at 1538–39.   
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party with insufficient spousal support at the end of the relationship. Finally, 
in both circumstances, express contracts will likely provide only minimal 
benefits to the weaker party since the parties need only meet procedural 
requirements and because the weaker party bargains in the shadow of a less 
favorable endowment.  
While the menu also embodies the notion of gender equality, this is 
imbalanced and eroding. Commitment to gender equality is supposedly 
reflected mainly through rules of equitable division of property in marriage. In 
addition, a common argument is that private ordering allows couples to 
structure their relationships in a way that diverges from traditional gender 
roles
281
—thus, arguably, the menu supports gender equality by encouraging 
the formation of family structures that transform entrenched notions of rigid 
gender roles and parenthood. However, the unenforceability of contracts that 
use non-monetary consideration such as housework devalues the worth of 
such carework and allows less freedom in structuring the relationships in the 
way that partners want.
282
 In addition, as argued before, while contracting 
potentially allows the primary caregiver to improve her position (vis-`a-vis the 
default rules), problems associated with bargaining power, the differing effect 
of the marriage market on men and women, and devaluation of housework 
have the potential to affect women disproportionately.  
To be sure, the existing system represents an attempt to balance 
between competing values. For example, as mentioned before, the trend 
governing enforcement of prenuptials aims to balance freedom of contract, 
predictability, and fairness.
283
 However, these efforts are reduced in the end 
to a checklist of formal requirements that ultimately give precedence to 
freedom of contract and predictability over fairness. Even when the system 
mandates that the contracting party has full information but, due to cognitive 
bias, lacks the capacity to evaluate the information, “it may often be 
reasonable to conclude that choices made under such circumstances are not 
autonomous.”284 Indeed, a system that is focused more on rules and 
procedures, declares contracts legally binding once a procedural checklist is 
satisfied, and disproportionately relies on autonomy, is closer to a monist 
system and does not reflect the principles of value pluralism.
285
 Such 
approach excludes the weighing of external factors—such as gaps in 
bargaining power, gender, marriage market, educational background, 
cultural differences, need, and so forth—that seem to be outside of the 





 Matsumura, supra note 275, at 191.  
282
 See Karen Engle et al., Round Table Discussion: Subversive Legal Moments?, 12 
TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 197, 220 (2003) (“Borelli re-entrenches the public/private split, denying 
women economic rights based on the fact that much of the work we do is on the so-called 
‘private’ side of this putative split.” (footnote omitted)).  
283
 See, e.g., Atwood & Bix, supra note 104, at 315.  
284
 TREBILOCK, supra note 278, at 243.  
285
 See Dagan, supra note 22, at 1410.  
286
 Leon Trakman, Pluralism in Contract Law, 58 BUFF. L. REV. 1031, 1046–48 (2010).  
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Conversely, a pluralistic court “can also invoke value pluralism to identify, 
weigh, and rank checklist requirements, such as the intention to enter into a 
marriage agreement against the fairness value of not enforcing onerous 
terms in those agreements to the disadvantage of a dependent spouse.”287  
One explanation for the limited success in providing effective choices 
and protections for the vulnerable party is the adoption of the neoclassicist 
approach, which favors form over substance and rules over standards. Such 
an approach is antipluralistic because neoclassicism prefers freedom of 
contract and autonomy while pluralism is committed to plurality of values, 
including fairness and substantive equality. As noted by Duncan Kennedy, 
“Formalities are premised on the lawmaker’s indifference as to which of a 
number of alternative relationships the parties decide to enter.”288 In other 
words, the parties are free to make their choices—as long as they signal that 
these choices were made voluntarily. Formalities, thus, from their essence, 
stand in contradiction to pluralists’ main claim: that the law should facilitate 
meaningful choice rather than just assuring the parties’ will to enter into the 
bargain is respected.  
In conclusion, it is unlikely that a menu of options that is built primarily on 
ex-ante bargaining between the partners will be able to advance a 
meaningful pluralism—because it will continue to entrench the unequal 
bargaining positions of the parties. The question remains, however: could a 
structural pluralism achieve these goals with a different setting, or is the 
problem that pluralism based predominantly on contractual principles will 
always fail to accomplish its objectives? The next Part examines this 
question.  
 
IV. TOWARD A TRULY PLURALISTIC VISION 
 
Can pluralistic theory—one that is not a fig leaf for neoclassicism— 
serve as a normative foundation for family law? Put differently, is it only the 
adoption of neoclassicism that fails pluralistic theory, or is pluralistic theory 
problematic in and of itself? I propose that pluralistic theory, as so far 
developed, while showing theoretical promise, also presents a few 
weaknesses and risks. Ironically, the main shortcoming of the theory stems 
from its strength: it is too elastic. This plasticity poses a risk: the adoption of 
freemarket policies under the rhetoric of pluralism—a problem that is 
exacerbated by the theory’s commitment to autonomy as a prominent value.  
Dagan’s version of pluralism—and value pluralism generally—may be 
too elastic to serve as a productive guideline for the construction of family 
law. An essential characteristic of value pluralism is the notion that “the 
ultimate values recognized by our community and by our law are irreducibly 




 Id. at 1048. 
288 
Kennedy, supra note 14, at 1691.   
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satisfy or maximize, nor can the variety of ultimate values be compared to 
one another along a single scale or metric.”289 This character of pluralism 
presents a question about its suitability to guide family law. If a plurality of 
good values—at times, conflicting values—exists, and can generate multiple 
and contradictory answers to a particular question—how can pluralistic 
theory help in determining which values should compose the menu of 
options?
290
 Just as one example: if autonomy is a good value, then the 
system should hold people to their promises or respect their choice not to 
enter into a contract—even if the result is less favorable to one party. But if 
fairness is important, too, then it means that some promises should not be 
enforced or that some obligations should be ascribed—perhaps even in the 
face of a specific intention to avoid such obligations. The example is quite 
simplistic, and yet raises the question: what is more important—autonomy or 
fairness? And how can pluralistic theory guide policymakers in solving this 
dilemma? The question thus is how much of fairness or equality versus 
autonomy should the menu of options embed?  
Hence, the problem with using pluralistic principles to guide family law is 
that the theory (or theories) still does not provide any satisfying tools to 
weigh which values will get precedence and in what way. Pluralistic theory 
merely suggests that rational lawmakers can have multiple ways to balance 
between conflicting values. While pluralistic theory does not entail that all 
choices are permissible, it does endorse the creation of a wide diversity of 
ways of life. “It condemns any law that totally precludes citizens from 
pursuing one of the necessary basic goods. It also condemns any law that 
prohibits citizens from instantiating a basic good in the only mode of which 




 David Wolitz, Indeterminacy, Value Pluralism, and Tragic Cases, 62 BUFF. L. REV. 
529, 531 (2014) (footnote omitted). Indeed, as argued by Michael Stocker, “‘Plural values’ . 
. . mean pretty much the same as ‘incommensurable values.’” Michael Stocker, Abstract 
and Concrete Value: Plurality, Conflict, and Maximization, in INCOMMENSURABILITY, 
INCOMPARABILITY, AND PRACTICAL REASON, 196, 203 (Ruth Chang ed., 1997).  
290
 Brett G. Scharffs, Adjudication and the Problems of Incommensurability, 42 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 1367, 1372 (2001) (“The problems of incommensurability arise when we try 
to compare plural, irreducible, and conflicting values, or choose between options that 
exhibit or will result in the realization of plural, irreducible, and conflicting values.” (footnote 
omitted)). Thus, some argue incommensurability presents a dilemma of rational choice 
when the lawmaker must decide between two options that are not commensurable. The 
question of whether incommensurability (or incomparability) of values precludes rational 
choice has been the subject of debate among philosophers for years and is far from being 
resolved. See, e.g., id. (“Incommensurability has been the focus of a sophisticated and 
technical debate in academic philosophy, where several books have been devoted to the 
subject.”); Sunstein, supra note 273, at 13–34 (surveying seven types of leading 
incomparability arguments and asserting that none is compelling). For the purpose of this 
Article, it is unnecessary to examine the various accounts. Rather, suffice it to note that 
even if incommensurability does not present a problem of rational choice, value pluralism, 
as so far developed, still does not tell much about how to balance and accommodate these 
competing values.  
291 
Henry S. Mather, Law-Making and Incommensurability, 47 MCGILL L.J. 345, 378 
(2002).  
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permissible resolution they should prefer.”292 Because pluralistic theory is 
amenable to so many compositions, it does not provide sufficient guidance 
for construction and evaluation of family law.  
Value pluralism does help to explain that different couples hold different 
valuations for their relationships, and the state should facilitate choices that 
affirm diverse kinds of valuations. Structural pluralism is the mechanism to 
accommodate this idea of providing a “diversity of spousal institutions.” 293 
No doubt, the notion that the law ought to recognize a variety of family 
structures—and in order to do that needs to offer a plurality of suitable 
options—is of great significance.
294
 In addition, while pluralistic principles do 
not offer one answer to a policy dilemma, in a world in which goods are 
incommensurable and often in conflict, pluralism can help to infuse family 
law doctrine by fleshing out the alternatives (instead of looking at one 
alternative, we might look at a few alternatives where different possibilities 
are acceptable in a liberal democracy). For instance, when deciding whether 
recognition of non-marital unions is desirable, pluralistic theory can guide the 
policymaker toward creating a range of options that will allow diverse types 
of family structures to tailor the obligations with some room to innovate but 
still promise financial security.
295
  
However, beyond these contributions, pluralistic theory does not add 
much to an ongoing debate about private ordering and the choice of 
regulatory framework in family law.
296
 In particular, the main and most 
fiercely debated question that has occupied family law in the past decade 
has been which types of families will get the recognition and protection of the 
law and what type of regulation will be appropriate.
297
 While the question of 
whether the state should offer a plurality of institutions is still somewhat 
controversial, questions of how to fill in this menu, which values and goals 
should be embedded in it, which types of families deserve this recognition, 




292 Id. at 388.  
293 Lifshitz, supra note 5, at 1569 (emphasis omitted) (footnote omitted).  
294 See, e.g., NANCY D. POLIKOFF, BEYOND (STRAIGHT AND GAY) MARRIAGE: VALUING 
ALL FAMILIES UNDER THE LAW: VALUING ALL FAMILIES UNDER THE LAW 126 (2008) (“A legal 
system in a pluralistic society that values all families should meld as closely as possible the 
purposes of a law with the relationships that that law covers.”).  
295 See, e.g., Aloni, supra note 1, at 613–19 (proposing a flexible registration scheme 
that fits diverse types of families).  
296 The idea that family law ought to recognize a menu of options for legal recognition 
of relationships is not a new one. See, e.g., Weisbrod, supra note 31, at 810 (“One way to 
think about a diversity of marital arrangements is to focus on individual contracts. Another 
is to think about structured menus, state-offered options, to which individuals give their 
consent.”). Further, the idea of a menu of options has already been adopted by several 
countries. See, e.g., BOWMAN, supra note 216, at 201–06 (describing the Nether- lands’ 
approach as “a cafeteria approach to cohabitants’ rights”).  
297 See, e.g., Elizabeth S. Scott & Robert E. Scott, From Contract to Status: 
Collaboration and the Evolution of Novel Family Relationships, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 293 
(2015) (evaluating which types of non-married families will be likely to secure recognition by 
the state).  
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theory offers relatively insignificant guidance for these last questions.
298
 
Eskridge is right in noting that his pluralistic analysis “do[es] not tell us which 
values family law ought to serve, [or] how to prioritize competing values.” 299 
Indeed, debates about the content of the menu of options “are enduring 
issues for public discourse, and their resolution will depend on the force of 
social practice and evolution of public norms.”300  
Not only does the elasticity of the theory not offer comprehensive 
guidance, but it also presents a tangible risk. As a result of its plasticity, the 
menu can be filled in by a few different structures, thus accommodating a 
neoclassical approach—or a thin notion of autonomy—while creating a false 
fa¸cade of pluralism. This is a genuine risk because pluralistic theory is 
immensely susceptible to free-market interpretation. Fundamentally, the 
theory proffers that adequate choice allows people to self-govern and, thus, 
with some limitations, the state should provide people these options. As 
stated by Cass Sunstein, “An understanding of diverse kinds of valuation 
helps explain why liberal regimes generally respect voluntary agreements. If 
people value things in different ways, the state should allow them to sort 
things out as they choose.”301  
Once again, the claim is not that pluralistic theory advocates 
unrestrained freedom of contract. As stated before, in cases of market 
failure, harm to third parties, and opportunistic behavior, pluralistic theory 
endorses a system that contains some restrictions.
302
 But the basic 
presumption of validity of contracts makes it especially amenable to the 
adoption of principles that vindicate freedom of contract over other values. 
Under this view, the adoption of the neoclassical approach and the focus on 
contractual instruments as the principle manifestation of family law pluralism 
(while the trend is toward diminishing registration schemes) are not merely a 
coincidence. They are a manifestation of the autonomy-based approach that 
underlines pluralistic theory.  
Relatedly, the other risk presented by pluralistic principles is that, while 
normatively it is committed to accommodating diverse values, in reality, the 
pluralistic system is especially prone to the entrenchment of existing values 
and balances, rather than to innovation. As the case of family law pluralism 






 Merely saying that a pluralistic approach is not characterized by a hands-off policy 
does not solve the problem. Even under Hanoch’s formulation, it seems like family law is 
moving toward facilitation of various regulatory regimes that are not necessarily 
characterized as “hands-off.” And yet, even active engagement—when focused mainly on 
procedural safeguards—can provide too little protection and favor the wealthier party.  
299
 Eskridge, supra note 1, at 1947.  
300
 Id.  
301
 Cass R. Sunstein, Incommensurability and Valuation in Law, 92 MICH. L. REV. 779, 
849 (1994).  
302
 Id. (“[E]ven a system that generally respects freedom of contract may block 
exchanges on several grounds. Typically such grounds involve some form of market failure 
. . . .”).  
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hardly a step toward value pluralism. As stated by Jedediah Purdy, “being 
constituted by well-established social practices, [Dagan’s pluralistic theory] 
tend[s] toward familiar values and balances of value, not radical 
innovations.”303 It seems evident in family law that pluralism tends to 
entrench existing attitudes rather than to create new ones. Thus—surely 
based on many political and cultural reasons—the majority of the new 
registrations that were established as a result of the same-sex marriage 
debate (civil unions and the like) have been abolished, while the existing 
system is composed of familiar contractual principles and committed to the 
privatization of dependency. (And, in any event, most of these registrations 
were marriagemimic, showing again how pluralism tends to be less 
imaginative and more inclined toward entrenching the status quo). If 
pluralistic theory had followed the normative orders that are spelled out by 
Dagan, the registration schemes should have survived the legalization of 
same-sex marriage and modified in a way that enables accommodation of 
diverse forms of kinships.  
Is a pluralistict theory that provides adequate choice and still maintains a 
robust substantive equality and autonomy possible? Such family law is likely 
to encounter the barriers, discussed above, stemming from the principles 
and rhetoric of pluralism. Yet, to move in this direction, family law ought to 
adopt a pluralistic version that is bounded by core values of substantive 
autonomy and equality. A vision of what such autonomy looks like is 
advanced by Maxine Eichner, who upholds a positive notion of autonomy— 
one that demands from the state a more active role in supporting the family, 
with specific emphasis on preventing the harm that the market may cause. 
Accordingly,  
 
[S]upport for familial autonomy requires more than the state’s 
forbearing from dictating family decisions. The state must also seek 
to ensure that families have the wherewithal to exercise this 
autonomy. Not only does this mean helping ensure that families have 
the capacity to make important decisions about their family, it also 
means that families have some reasonable means to effectuate their 
decisions. While the primary threat to such autonomy has long been 
seen to come from the state, much of today’s threats of 




A pluralistic vision that follows Eichner’s vision must balance between 
fostering individuality, on the one hand, and commitment and 
interdependency, on the other. Such a menu of options cannot rely solely on 
principles of private rulemaking and on commitments to form over substance. 





 Jedediah Purdy, Commentary, Some Pluralism About Pluralism: A Comment on 
Hanoch Dagan’s “Pluralism and Perfectionism in Private Law,” 113 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 
9, 18 (2013).  
304
 Maxine Eichner, Beyond Private Ordering: Families and the Supportive State, 23 J. 
AM. ACAD. MATRIM. L. 305, 342 (2010).  
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change in default rules, different registration schemes (more creative than 
simply marriage-by-a-different-name), and rules that prevent opportunistic 
behavior and substantive reviews of contracts.  
In conclusion, while pluralism offers an intriguing and valuable 
perspective for regulation of relationships, the theory, in its current stage, is 
insufficient to serve as a primary normative source for the guidance of the 
field. Moreover, the plasticity of the theory risks its adoption of laissez-faire 




Pluralistic theory is “hot” in legal academia, and family law—which has 
already started its progression toward offering multiple options—can 
generally serve as a laboratory to examine the potential and the pitfalls of 
pluralistic theory. The family law laboratory exposes that pluralism is a false 
hope and quite oversold. One emerging cautionary tale is that structural 
pluralism tends to revolve around principles of private ordering. Unlike some 
European countries that created structural pluralism composed both of 
registration schemes (civil unions and the like) and contracts (or, as in the 
case of the French PACS, a combination of both),
305
 the emerging U.S. 
pluralistic structure relies mainly on contractual elements. Not only is this 
pluralism manifested by the expansion of options for private rulemaking, but 
also the values underpinning this system are primarily those of the free 
market. The manifestations of pluralism under the guise of familiar and 
traditional concepts raise the concern that, in practice, pluralistic structure 
tends to be non-innovative.  
In political science referencing the United States, pluralistic theory— 
concisely, the idea that political power is distributed among interest groups—
has been the dominant theory for years.
306
 The critique of the theory— 
primarily that it fails to account for economic inequality in the U.S. and 
ignores the way businesses exert influence on the political agenda—has 
been so prominent that some scholars suggest that only a new theory, one 
that considers questions of economic structure, can serve as a foundation for 
political theory.
307
 Scholars have thus developed a new and relatively 
accepted theory titled “neopluralism.”308 Neopluralism “is a more pessimistic 





 The French Pacte Civil de Solidarit´e is an institution that is semi-contractual 
semiregistration. For a description of the French PACS, see Aloni, supra note 1, at 632–38.  
306
 See John F. Manley, Neo-Pluralism: A Class Analysis of Pluralism I and Pluralism 
II, 77 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 368, 369–71 (1983).  
307 
Id. at 382.  
308
 See, e.g., Alexander Hicks & Frank J. Lechner, Neopluralism and Neofunctionalism 
in Political Sociology, in THE HANDBOOK OF POLITICAL SOCIOLOGY: STATES, CIVIL SOCIETIES, 
AND GLOBALIZATION 54 (T. Janoski et al. eds., 2005).  
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verse groups to influence the political agenda, and provides a normative 
framework that recognizes power differences between groups in society.
309
  
Current scholarly accounts in family law have not followed the lead of 
political scientists and addressed the connection between distributive justice 
and pluralism. This Article shows that, without a particular commitment to 
core values that would limit choice, pluralism will likely revolve around 
freedom of contract and autonomy. Commitment to distributive justice 
requires an embodiment of substantive notions of liberty and equality. To 
theorize the connection between pluralism and distributive justice, family law 
(and likely private law generally) needs to formulate a theory similar to 
neopluralism: one that will maintain and develop choice and accommodate 
diverse structures of relationships, but will also be committed to distributive 
justice in the broader sense. Such a theory likely involves more than 
expansion of the safeguards of fairness by judges; it would entail changes in 
the default rules as well, to influence the content of the bargain. How to 
promulgate a system that lies at the foundation of pluralistic principles and is 
committed to distributive justice, and whether such a system can exist, is an 
open question at the moment. But what is clear is that pluralism, and 
especially one that stems from a commitment to individual autonomy, cannot 
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